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PROTECTING OUR NATION'S
POLITICAL DUOPOLY: THE SUPREMES SPOIL
THE LIBERTARIANS' PARTY
Gary D. Allison*
The necessity for [strict scrutiny] becomes evident when we consider that major parties,
which by definition are ordinarily in control of legislative institutions, may seek to
perpetuate themselves at the expense of developing minor parties.
Justice Thurgood Marshalll
I. INTRODUCTION
Have pity on third-party candidates, members, and advocates. It has been 149
years since a third party-the Republican Party-ascended into major-party status. 2 No
independent or third-party candidate has ever won the presidency.3  In fact, no
independent or third-party presidential candidate has earned a single electoral vote since
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. LL.M., Columbia University School of Law
(1976); J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law (1972); B.S., University of Tulsa (1968).
1. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 201 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. The Republican Party was founded in 1854 on the planks of opposition to slavery and endorsement of
an economic policy featuring federal investment in internal infrastructure, and a high tariff protecting the
industrial sectors. A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History ofAmerican Political Parties 96, 100
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2000). At that time, the United States had only one major party, the
Democratic Party; the other major party, the Whigs, was badly splintered by the slavery question, id. at 87, and
stopped fielding candidates for President after 1852, see id. See also John F. Bibby & L. Sandy Maisel, Two
Parties-Or More? The American Party System 24-27 (Westview Press 1998). In the presidential election
of 1856, James Buchanan, the Democratic candidate, won, but the Republican candidate, John C. Frdmont,
finished second. Reichley, supra, at 101. Abraham Lincoln became the first Republican to be elected
President in 1860. Id. at 93. Lincoln's election not only ushered in the American Civil War, id at 93, 104-05,
it also inaugurated an era of Republican dominance in which its candidates won eleven out of thirteen
presidential elections from 1860 through 1908: Abraham Lincoln (1860, 1864), Ulysses Grant (1868, 1872),
Rutherford Hayes (1876), James Garfield (1880), Benjamin Harrison (1888), William McKinley (1896, 1900),
Theodore Roosevelt (1904), and William Taft (1908). Joseph Nathan Kane, Facts About the Presidents: A
Compilation of Biographical and Historical Data 608 (Ace Bks. 1976).
3. Our nation's forty-three Presidents have belonged to only five political parties: Federalist (2),
Democratic-Republican (4), Democratic (14), Whig (4), and Republican (19). Dave Leip, Dave Leip's Atlas of
U.S. Presidential Elections: The Presidents, http://uselectionatlas.org/INFORMATION/INFORMATION/
presidents.php (accessed Sept. 11, 2005). Each of these parties was a major party during the years its
candidates were elected President. Reichley, supra n. 2, at chs. 3-4 (describing the formation and decline of
the Federalist Party; formation and evolution of the Democratic-Republican Party); id. at ch. 5 (describing the
evolution of the Democratic-Republican Party into the Democratic Party; formation and decline of the Whig
Party); id. at chs. 6-17 (describing the continuing competition between the Democratic and Republican
Parties).
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George Wallace won forty-six electoral votes in 1968, 4 and only four candidates earned
electoral votes from 1892 through 1964. 5 Independent and third-party candidates rarely
become governors6 or win seats in the United States Senate or the United States House
of Representatives. 7  So, public life in the United States has been dominated by a
political duopoly comprised of its two major political parties.
Nevertheless, since the mid-1960s and early-1970s, the United States' electorate
has exhibited less major-party loyalty and political participation. The percent of voters
identifying themselves as "Strong Partisan" has declined, 8 while the percent of voters
4. Four persons have received one electoral vote each since 1968, but only because electors pledged to
other candidates violated their pledge. These include: John Hospers (Libertarian, 1972), Ronald Reagan (a
non-candidate, 1976), Lloyd Bentsen (the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, 1988), John Edwards (the
Democratic vice-presidential candidate, 2004). Dave Leip, Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections:
United States Presidential Election Results, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/ (accessed
Sept. 13, 2005). In addition, since 1968, five candidates have received over a million popular votes but failed
to earn an electoral vote: John Schmitz (1.1 million, American Party, 1972), John Anderson (5.7 million,
Independent, 1980), H. Ross Perot (19.7 million, Independent, 1992), H. Ross Perot (8.1 million, Reform
Party, 1996), and Ralph Nader (2.9 million, Green Party, 2000). Id.
5. These candidates include: James B. Weaver (twenty-two electoral votes, Populist Party, 1892),
Theodore Roosevelt (eighty-eight electoral votes, Progressive Party, 1912), Robert M. La Follette (thirteen
electoral votes, fusion candidate of the Progressive and Socialist Parties, 1924), and Strom Thurmond
(thirty-nine electoral votes, States' Rights Democratic Party, 1948). J. David Gillespie, Politics at the
Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America app. 3 (USC Press 1993).
6. From 1892 through 1990, only nine persons running as independent or third-party candidates were
elected governor. These persons include: Davis H. Waite (Colorado, fusion candidate of the Populist and
Silver Democratic Parties, 1892), L. D. Lewelling (Kansas, fusion candidate of the Populist & Democratic
Parties who received most of his votes on the Populist Party line, 1892), Murphy J. Foster (Louisiana, fusion
candidate of the Anti-Lottery Democrats and the Farm Alliance, 1892), John H. Leedy (Kansas, fusion
candidate of the Populist & Democratic Parties who received most of his votes on the Populist Party
line, 1896), Hiram Johnson (California, Progressive, 1914), Sidney J. Carts (Florida, fusion candidate of the
Prohibition Party and Independent Democrats, 1916), James B. Longley (Maine, Independent, 1974), Walter J.
Hickel (Alaska, Alaska Independence Party, 1990), and Lowell P. Weicker (Connecticut, A Connecticut
Party, 1990). Id. at app. 5. In 1994, Angus King was elected as an independent candidate in Maine, Bibby &
Maisel, supra n. 2, at 72-73, and in 1998, a former professional wrestler, Jesse Ventura, was elected as a
Reform Party candidate in Minnesota, Reichley, supra n. 2, at 335. Currently, there are no governors who
were elected as independent or third-party candidates. Wikipedia, List of United States Governors,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of UnitedStatesGovernors (last updated Sept. 12, 2005).
7. There were forty-four congressional sessions from 1901 through 1989. During that time, the number of
U.S. Senators from third parties were zero during twenty-seven sessions (1903-1913, 1915-1923, 1947-1971,
1977-1989), only one during thirteen sessions (1913-1915, 1923-1935, 1941-1947, 1971-1977), only two
during two sessions (1901-1903, 1935-1937), and only three during two sessions (1937-1941). Gillespie,
supra n. 5, at app. 4. During this same time period, the number of U.S. House members from third parties were
none during twenty-three sessions (1903-1911, 1951-1989), one during five sessions (1911-1913, 1921-1923,
1929-1933, 1949-1951), two during three sessions (1919-1921, 1945-1949), three during two sessions (1923-
1925, 1927-1929), four during two sessions (1939-1941, 1943-1945), five during five sessions (1901-1903,
1917-1919, 1925-1927, 1933-1935, 1941-1943), eight during one session (1915-1917), nine during one
session (1913-1915), ten during one session (1935-1937), and thirteen during one session (1937-1939). Id.
Commencing with the 1923-1925 congressional session, every third-party Senator or House member came
from Minnesota, Wisconsin, or New York. Id. Currently, there is only one Senator and one House member
who is neither a Democrat nor Republican-Senator Jim Jeffords, an Independent from Vermont, United States
Senate, Senators of the 109th Congress, http://www.senate.gov/general/contactinformation/senators-cfm.cfm
(accessed Sept. 13, 2005), and Congressman Bernard Sanders, also an Independent from Vermont, U.S. House
of Representatives, Official Alphabetical List of the House of Representatives of the United States One
Hundred Ninth Congress, http://clerk.house.gov/members/olmbr.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2005).
8. From 1952-1964, the percent of voters identifying themselves as "Strong Partisan" was within
a 35-38% range. National Election Studies, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior:
Strength of Partisanship 1952-2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_3.htm (last updated
Sept. 13, 2003). In contrast, from 1966-2002, the percent of voters identifying themselves as Strong Partisan
was within a 23-31% range. Id.
[Vol. 41:291
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saying they are leaning toward being Independent has increased.9 Voter turnout has also
declined, 10 and voters have increasingly engaged in ticket splitting.1 1  In recent years,
these trends have given rise to greater interest in alternatives to major-party candidates
within the U.S. electorate, 12 and to much scholarly speculation on whether perceived
flaws in our politics can be remedied by revitalizing our traditional two-party system or
by facilitating the emergence of a multiparty system. 
13
9. Although the percent of voters saying they are independent or apolitical has remained stable within a
range of 9-13%, except for the turbulent 1970s when the range was 14-18%, the percent of the voters saying
that they are leaning independent has increased significantly from a range of 12-17% in the period 1952-1966,
to a range of 18-28% in the period 1968-2002. Id
10. The percent of the electorate that claimed to have voted in polling conducted immediately after national
elections was within a range of 58-79% during the period of 1948-1972, and within a range of 47-75% during
the period of 1974-2002. National Election Studies, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral
Behavior: Voter Turnout 1948-2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab6a_2.htm (last updated
Sept. 13, 2003).
11. The behavior of ticket splitting, where the voter votes for a presidential candidate of one party and a
Congressional candidate of another party, can be an indicator of partisanship if the party of the presidential
candidate for whom they voted offers attractive Congressional candidates. From 1952-1968, the percent of
voters who engaged in ticket splitting was within a range of 12-18%, while the percent was within a range
of 22-30% during the period 1972-1992. National Election Studies, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and
Electoral Behavior: Split Ticket Voting Presidential/Congressional 1952-2000, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/
nesguide/toptable/tab9b 2.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2003). Perhaps reflecting the polarizing effects of the
Clinton impeachment, ticket splitting declined to 17% in the 1996 election and 19% in the 2000 election. Id.
12. The electorate's increased interest in independent and third-party candidates is reflected by four such
candidates winning gubernatorial elections in four different states during the 1990s, see supra n. 6, the return of
independents to the U.S. Senate and U.S. House after an absence of over forty years, see supra n. 7, and the
relative strong showings of the H. Ross Perot (1992, 1996) and Ralph Nader (2000) presidential campaigns, see
supra n. 4. During this same time period, an increasing number of third parties have fielded many candidates
for public office. For example, in 1994
the Libertarian party ran fifteen candidates for governor, another fifteen for the U.S. Senate, and
eighty-one for the U.S. House of Representatives. Thirteen of these candidates polled more than 5
percent of the vote; nine of them polled enough votes to hold the balance of power between the two
major party candidates. In that same election year, the emerging Green party ran six candidates for
these offices, one of whom held the balance of power in his state. In 1996, the Libertarians ran 126
candidates for the House or Senate ... and the Greens ran seven.
Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 73-74.
Additional evidence that the third-party impulse has been more vibrant in recent years than it has in
preceding decades comes from the Green Party's 1992 successes in electing thirty-seven persons to local public
offices across ten different states, including the Mayor of Cordova, Arkansas, and in qualifying "as a statutory
party entitled to ballot access," Gillespie, supra n. 5, at 286 (footnote omitted), in Alaska, Hawaii, Arizona,
New Mexico, and California. Id. A variety of other third parties have been busy fielding candidates and
organizing nationally, including the Peace and Freedom Party, the Conservative Party (New York), the Liberal
Party (New York), the New Alliance Party, the Natural Law Party, the Populist Party, and the Tax Payers
Party. Id. at 286-87. Indeed, the United States Federal Election Commission identified seventy-five party
labels under which candidates for President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives appeared
on state ballots during the 2004 election. United States Federal Election Commission, A Guide to Party Labels,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/partylabels.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2005).
13. Examples of this scholarship include:
I. A. James Reichley's The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties. Reichley,
supra n. 2. Arguing that the two-party system has well-served democracy in the United States
through most of its history but "that parties are now endangered by a number of cultural,
technological, social, political, and legal changes in American life; and that concerned supporters of
a free society should therefore seek means for renewing the vitality of parties and the dynamism of
the party system." Id. at 13. To support this argument, Reichley describes the current weakness of
the major parties from the national to the local level, id. at chs. 18-20, and then provides an analysis
of what can be done to revitalize them, id. at ch. 21. Reichley explicitly rejects the multiparty
solution, id. at 342-43, and concludes that it would "cause far more social damage than political
good," Reichley, supra n. 2, at 343 (footnote omitted).
2005]
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Against this background of third-party electoral futility and growing dissatisfaction
with our traditional two-party system, the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma ("LPO") made
a modest attempt to improve its fortunes by inviting all registered voters to participate in
its 2000 primary elections. 14 It was rebuffed in this endeavor by the Oklahoma Election
Board, which ruled that only registered Libertarians and independents could vote in the
Libertarian Party's primaries. 
15
The Election Board's ruling was consistent with Oklahoma's semi-closed primary
law, which states:
No registered voter shall be permitted to vote in any Primary Election or Runoff Primary
Election of any political party except the political party of which his registration form
shows him to be a member .... 16
2. John Bibby and L. Sandy Maisel's Two Parties-Or More? Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2.
Documents recent electoral activities of third parties, id. at 3-16; presents a history of third parties
in the United States, id. at ch. 2; documents the unique barriers imposed on third parties by the
United States' form of government, cultural norms, and laws institutionalizing the two major
parties, id. at ch. 3; documents the general public's recent flirtation with third-party and independent
candidates, id. at ch. 4; and hypothesizes about the future strength and vitality of our two-party
system. Based on their assessment of the performances of three recently elected
third-party/independent governors, Bibby and Maisel conclude that "the citizenry is legitimately just
as disappointed with third-party governors as they have been with Democrats or Republicans.
Moreover, we believe that effective choice and the ability to express views on the issues of the day
have been obscured by the presence of these most successful third-party politicians." Bibby and
Maisel, supra n. 2, at 90-91.
3. Theodore J. Lowi & Joseph Romance, A Republic of Parties? Debating the Two-Party System
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1998). The two authors, writing in separate essays, offer
advocacy for a multiparty system, Theodore J. Lowi, Toward a Responsible Three-Party System:
Prospects and Obstacles, in Theodore J. Lowi & Joseph Romance, A Republic of Parties? Debating
the Two-Party System 3-30 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1998) [hereinafter Lowi, Prospects &
Obstacles], and advocacy for maintaining, but reforming, our traditional two-party system, Joseph
Romance, Gridlock and Reform at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in Theodore J. Lowi &
Joseph Romance, A Republic of Parties? Debating the Two-Party System 31-74 (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers 1998).
4. David K. Ryden, The United States Supreme Court as an Obstacle to Political Reform, in
Superintending Democracy: The Courts and the Political Process ch. 8 (Christopher P. Banks &
John C. Green eds., U. Akron Press 2001). Ryden contends that the United States Supreme Court,
in its decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), subordinated "[t]he
basic goal of 'fair and effective representation' .. . to legitimate, but lower rank, values of political
stability and ballot control." Ryden, supra, at 164. Ryden also contends that the U.S. Supreme
Court's approach in Timmons is an obstacle to our nation undertaking a badly needed
re-examination of the "assumptions underlying the two-party system." Id. Although he is "not
ready to wholeheartedly embrace a multiparty system," Ryden urges the Court to develop "an
analysis of party systems from a functional perspective within the context of representation
objectives" so that it "might ... better locate minor and new parties on the constitutional/legal
spectrum." Id. at 186.
5. Douglas J. Amy, Entrenching the Two-Party System: The Supreme Court's Fusion Decision, in The
U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process ch. 8 (David K. Ryder ed., 2d. ed., Geo. U. Press
2002). Contending that the U.S. Supreme Court's defense of our traditional two-party system in
Timmons, was based on the Justices' uncritical acceptance of the benefits of the two-party system
and the alleged dangers of a multiparty system. Id. at 156-60. To support his thesis, Amy offers a
critical analysis of the performance of multiparty systems in other countries to demonstrate that a
multiparty system may work as well as, or better than, our traditional two-party system. Id.
at 160-70.
14. Randy Ellis, Suit Seeks to End Closed Primary, Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK) 4A (June 20,
2000).
15. Id.
16. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-104(A) (Supp. 2004).
[Vol. 41:291
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A recognized political party may permit registered voters designated as Independents... to
vote in a Primary Election or Runoff Primary Election of the party.17
In response, the LPO, some registered Democrats, and some registered Republicans filed
suit in federal district court, contending their First Amendment rights of political
association were violated by Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law. 
18
The district court ruled against the LPO. 19 It found that Oklahoma's semi-closed
primary law did not impose severe burdens on the LPO, and furthered the important state
interest in "preserving the political parties as viable and identifiable interest groups,
insuring that the results of a primary election.., accurately reflect the voting of the party
members."
20
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.
2 1
First, it found that Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law severely burdened the LPO's
freedom of political association because it restricted the LPO's choice as to which voters
would choose its standard-bearers in general elections. 22 Then, it found that Oklahoma's
semi-closed primary law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest
because Oklahoma did not demonstrate how allowing one party to invite all registered
voters to participate in its primaries would destabilize state politics or seriously burden
the associational rights of other parties.
23
On May 23, 2005, by a six-to-three decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals in the case of Clingman v. Beaver.24 In its opinion, the
Court held that Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut2 5 was distinguishable from
Clingman and therefore did not mandate that strict scrutiny be used to judge the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law.26 The Court also held that
Oklahoma's semiclosed primary advances a number of regulatory interests that this Court
recognizes as important: It "'preserv[es] [political] parties as viable and identifiable interest
17. Id. at § 1-104(B)(1).
18. Br. of Petr., 2004 WL 2681536 at *6, Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).
19. Clingman v. Beaver, 2003 WL 745562 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2003).
20. Beaver v. Clingman, 363 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 2004) (intemal quotation marks omitted,
ellipses in original).
21. Id. at 1061.
22. Id. at 1055-58. The Court felt this conclusion was compelled by earlier U.S. Supreme Court opinions
in which strict scrutiny was applied to a closed primary system that prevented parties from inviting registered
independents to vote in their primaries, and to a blanket primary system that permitted each voter to decide
office-by-office which party's primary to vote in, regardless of her own party affiliation or lack thereof. Id.
at 1056-58 (citing, respectively, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)).
23. Id. at 1058-61.
24. 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005). The main opinion was written by Justice Thomas, which was joined in its
entirety by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. See id at 2042 (O'Connor & Breyer,
JJ., concurring by joining Justice Thomas's opinion except for Part Il-A); id. at 2047 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined entirely by Justice Ginsburg, and substantially by Justice Souter). Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined
Justice Thomas's opinion except for a section in which Justice Thomas contended that the LPO, and voters
who were registered in other parties, do not have their rights of association severely burdened by a state law
requiring registered members of a particular party to change their registration if they wish to participate in
another party's primaries. Id. at 2035-37, 2042.
25. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
26. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2037-39.
2005]
5
Allison: Protecting Our Nation's Political Duopoly: The Supremes Spoil the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005
TULSA LA W REVIEW
groups,' enhances parties' electioneering and party-building efforts, and guards against
party raiding and 'sore loser' candidacies by spumed primary contenders."
27
Thus, the Court thwarted the LPO's modest attempts to advance its cause against the
overwhelming odds that confront all minor political parties in the United States.
In succeeding parts of this article, the author evaluates Clingman from the
perspective of a long-time Constitutional Law professor who is a hyper-political
activist. 28 In Part II of this analysis, the author details the Court's opinion. Part III
contains the author's argument that, as measured against the realities of primary politics
and the law governing the regulation of party activities and primary elections, the Court
used questionable logic in distinguishing Clingman from Tashjian and concluding that
Oklahoma's semi-closed primary actually advances the regulatory interests asserted by
the State. Finally, in Part IV, the author asserts that Clingman is the product of a prior
precedent that extended undeserved protection to the two-party system and an
unfortunate example of how the Court's desire to protect a mythical two-party system
may stifle political innovations that could make our political system work better for more
people.
II. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Constitutionally Cognizable Associations
At the outset, the Court dealt with the issue of whether the LPO's desire to have
persons who are registered in other parties vote in its primaries created any
constitutionally cognizable political associations. A narrow five-to-four majority,
comprised of two concurring and three dissenting Justices, found that the associational
interests of the LPO and voters from other parties were constitutionally cognizable.
There was common agreement among the Justices and the parties to Clingman that
two possible political associational interests were at issue: (1) the right of political parties
to determine who shall participate in their processes for selecting nominees for public
office, and (2) the rights of voters who are registered members of one party to accept the
invitation of another party to participate in its primary elections. 29 The issue of whether
these associational interests were constitutionally cognizable divided the six Justices
constituting the decisional majority.
Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Thomas asserted that "a voter who
is unwilling to disaffiliate from another party to vote in the LPO's primary forms little
27. Id. at 2039 (quoting, respectively, Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845, 848 (D. Conn. 1976), and
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)) (brackets in original, citations omitted).
28. The author has worked in campaigns for Democratic candidates at all levels for thirty-nine years. In
addition, the author has been a Democratic Party nominee for the United States House of Representatives
(1986), Chair of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma's First Congressional District (1989-1991), Oklahoma
First District Campaign manager for two Democratic candidates for President (Gary Hart-1984, Howard
Dean-2004), and a co-founder and chair of a political action committee dedicated to reviving progressive
politics in Oklahoma (Just Progress PAC-2004 to present).
29. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2035-36; id. at 2044 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 2047-48 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Br. of Petr. at **14-15, supra n. 18; Br. of Respts., 2004 WL 3017301 at **6-7, Clingman v.
Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).
[Vol. 41:291
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'association' with the LPO-nor the LPO with him." 30  To Justice Thomas, it was
obvious that such voters do not want to form an association with the LPO "in any formal
sense.'31 They wish only to "[cast] a vote for a Libertarian candidate in a particular
primary election, rather than.., banding together with fellow citizens committed to the
LPO's political goals and ideas." 32  After noting that voters may desire to vote for
numerous candidates across many party lines during primary elections, Justice Thomas
concluded that "'the concept of freedom of association' . . . 'ceases to be of any analytic
use"' if it "'is extended' to a voter's every desire at the ballot box." 33 In other words, the
plurality Justices would have decided Clingman in favor of Oklahoma on the basis that
the LPO and voters registered as members of other parties do not have any
constitutionally cognizable associational interests with respect to the LPO's primary
elections.
Clingman had to be decided on other grounds because Justice O'Connor, writing a
concurring opinion for herself and Justice Breyer, contended that "where a party invites a
voter to participate in its primary and the voter seeks to do so, we should begin with the
premise that there are significant associational interests at stake. '34  For her, these
interests arise from the critically important function of primary elections; determining the
"range of choices available at-and often the presumptive winner of-the general
election." 35  With respect to primary elections, the voter's associational interest is to
have "a meaningful voice [by joining] together with likeminded others at the polls," and
the party's associational interest is choosing "who will participate in selecting [its]
candidate" since this choice "plays a critical role in determining both [its] message and
its prospects of success in the electoral contest." 36 Unlike the plurality Justices, Justice
O'Connor refused to elevate the act of registration over the act of voting as a key
indicator of a constitutionally cognizable association between a voter and a political
party.
37
Moreover, Justice O'Connor had little difficulty in accepting the idea that a voter
could have constitutionally cognizable associational interests in two different parties,
especially when one of them is a minor party, "during particular election cycles or in
elections for particular offices." 38 To her, this dual association during primary elections
30. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2036.
31. Id.
32. Id. (footnote omitted).
33. Id. (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
34. Id. at 2044. The dissenting Justices also came to this conclusion. Writing for himself, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Souter, Justice Stevens asserted that "[i]f a third party invites her to participate in its
primary election, her right to support the candidate of her choice merits constitutional protection, whether she
elects to make a speech, to donate funds, or to cast a ballot." Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2047. He found that such
a right assumes even greater importance when it "is reinforced by the right of the [third party) to associate with
willing voters." Id. at 2048.
35. Id. at 2042.
36. Id. at 2043.
37. Id. In this regard, Justice O'Connor observed that "[t]he fact that voting is episodic does
not ... undermine its associational significance; it simply reflects the special character of the electoral process,
which allows citizens to join together at regular intervals to shape government through the choice of public
officials." Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2043.
38. Id. at 2043, 2043-44.
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was a logical extension of a person's protected rights to attend the meetings of, and give
money to, a particular party and its candidates even though he/she is registered as a
member of another party.
39
B. Relaxed Scrutiny
The Court's most critical holding was that Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law
need not be subjected to strict scrutiny because it does not severely burden the
associational rights of political parties or registered voters. 40  As a consequence, the
Court permitted Oklahoma to justify its semi-closed primary by showing that it advances
important state interests instead of demonstrating that is was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.
4 1
According to the majority, Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law imposes two
associational burdens: (1) it requires voters who are registered as a member of a
particular party, and who want to vote in the primaries of another party, to reregister
either as a member of the other party or as an independent;42 (2) it prohibits a party from
being able take action unilaterally to broaden its base simply by inviting all registered
voters to participate in its primaries since some voters must take the intermediate step of
reregistering to accept the invitation. 4 3 The Court's analysis of whether these burdens
were severe enough to justify subjecting Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law to strict
scrutiny focused almost entirely on distinguishing Clingman from Tashjian. This focus
was the product of the majority's assertions that strict scrutiny was applied in Tashjian,
and the LPO's argument that strict scrutiny must be applied in Clingman because "the
burden imposed by Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system is no less severe than the
burden at issue in Tashjian.
' 44
In Tashjian, the Republican Party of Connecticut wanted to invite registered
independents to vote in it primaries.4 5 At that time, Connecticut had a closed primary
law mandating that only those voters registered as members of a particular party could
vote in that party's primaries.4 6 The Clingman Court said that the burdens on the right
of political association at issue in Tashjian were the requirement that independent voters
"affiliate publicly with a party to vote in its primary" 4 7 and the inability of political
parties to "'broaden opportunities for joining ... by their own act, without any
intervening action by potential voters."
4 8
39. Id.
40. See id at 2037-39; supra n. 26 and accompanying text.
41. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2037-39.
42. Id. at 2038. Although she joined this portion of the majority opinion, in her concurring opinion Justice
O'Connor framed the burden differently. Her emphasis was not on the act of registering, but rather expressed
empathy for "voter[s] with ... significant commitment to a major party [who] must forfeit registration with that
party in order to participate in the LPO primary." Id. at 2045.
43. Id. at 2038.
44. Id. at 2037-38.
45. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210.
46. Id. at 210-11.
47. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2038.
48. Id. (quoting to Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n. 7) (ellipses in original).
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To the Clingman Court, there were significant differences between Clingman and
Tashjian as to associational burdens placed on voters. In Tashjian, independent voters
wishing to accept the Republican Party's invitation to vote in its primaries were required
to affiliate publicly with the Republican Party, whereas in Clingman voters wishing to
accept the LPO's invitation to vote in its primaries could reregister either as an LPO
member or as an independent. 49 Thus, in Clingman the affected voters did not have to
affiliate publicly with any party to vote in the LPO primary, but they did have to
disaffiliate publicly with a political party. 50 As partial justification of its holding that
Tashjian did not mandate that strict scrutiny be applied to Oklahoma's semi-closed
primary law, the Court basically ruled that it is more burdensome for a voter publicly to
affiliate with than to disaffiliate from a political party.
51
The Court did find that the associational burdens placed on political parties in
Tashjian were indistinguishable from those involved in Clingman.52 However, the Court
found that even the Tashjian Court did not find these burdens to be severe.5 3 This
finding cemented the Court's holding that Tashjian did not mandate that Oklahoma's
semi-closed primary law be justified by strict scrutiny.
As a part of its analysis of Tashjian, the Court opined that the Tashjian Court had
"applied strict scrutiny with little discussion of the magnitude of the [associational]
burdens." 54 It also noted that the independent voters involved in Tashjian could have
voted in any partisan primary simply by reregistering as a member of a political party "as
late as the day before the primary." 55 Then, the Court starkly proclaimed that "requiring
voters to register with a party prior to participating in the party's primary minimally
burdens voters' associational rights."56 By doing so, the Court not only held that such a
burden on associational rights is too minimal to invoke strict scrutiny, it also cast doubt
on the continuing viability of Tashjian's holding that states may not prevent parties from
allowing independents to participate in their primaries without first formally affiliating as
a party member.
The Court's registration proclamation made reference to the plurality portion of
Justice Thomas's opinion wherein he explained why he believed that the disaffiliation
burden imposed on voters by Oklahoma's semi-closed primary was slight.57 As a part of
his explanation, he noted that in the case of Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
58
the Court had ruled that a law forbidding a candidate to appear on the general election
ballot as the nominee of more than one party did not severely burden the associational










57. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2038.
58. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
59. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2036-37.
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Justice Thomas asserted that the burden involved in Timmons was not severe
because it "neither regulated the New Party's internal decision-making process, nor
compelled it to associate with voters of any political persuasion." 6° By this standard, he
found that the burdens imposed by Oklahoma's semi-closed primary law were minimal
because it "does not regulate the LPO's internal processes, its authority to exclude
unwanted members, or its capacity to communicate with the public." 6 1 This led Justice
Thomas to conclude that "[i]f a party may be prevented from associating with the
candidate of its choice ... because that candidate refuses to disaffiliate from another
political party, a party may also be prevented from associating with a voter who refuses
to do the same." 62 Not satisfied to stop with this conclusion, he went on to assert that it
is not difficult for a voter to disaffiliate from a political party because all he or she must
do is comply with state registration requirements.
63
As its final word on its refusal to apply strict scrutiny to Oklahoma's semi-closed
primary law, the Court articulated a "slippery slope" type of argument. "To deem
ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe would subject virtually every electoral
regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper the ability of States to run efficient and equitable
elections, and compel federal courts to rewrite State electoral codes." 64 Having rejected
strict scrutiny as the analytical standard, the Court proceeded to judge Oklahoma's
semi-closed primary law under a standard premised on the principle that "[w]hen a state
electoral provision places no heavy burden on associational rights, 'a State's important
regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.'
65
C Important Justifying State Interests
The Court cited Nader v. Schaffer,66 a case that it had summarily affirmed without
opinion, as authority for its assertion that it had recognized that "preserve[ing] [political]
parties as viable and identifiable interest groups," 67 and "enhanc[ing] parties'
electioneering and party-building efforts," 68 are important state interests. 69 In addition,
60. Id. at 2037.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. See id. Curiously, after refusing to join the plurality Justices' view that in the context of who can vote
in primary elections, there are no constitutionally cognizable associational interests between a party and a
prospective voter who refuses to register as a member of that party, see Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2042-44,
Justice O'Connor joined the majority for the proposition that the re-registration burden in Clingman was not
severe, id. at 2044-45. With respect to this issue, she proclaimed that "a party's inability to persuade a voter to
disaffiliate from a rival party would suggest not the presence of anticompetitive regulatory restrictions, but
rather the party's failure to win the voter's allegiance." Id. at 2045. Accordingly, she concluded that "[t]he
semiclosed primary law, standing alone, does not impose a significant obstacle to participation in the LPO's
primary." Id.
64. Id. at 2039.
65. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2039 (quoting Timmons, 520 U.S. 358).
66. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
67. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2032 (quoting Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 845) (internal quotation marks omitted,
second bracket in original).
68. Id. (citing Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 848).
69. Id. at 2039.
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the Court cited Storer v. Brown70 as authority for its assertion that it had recognized that
"[guarding] against party raiding and 'sore loser' candidacies by spurned primary
contenders"7 1 are important state interests as well.72 Thereafter, the Court found that
Oklahoma's semi-closed primary advanced each of these interests by hypothesizing
harms that would befall the LPO, other political parties, and Oklahoma's political system
if great numbers of voters registered as members of other parties voted in LPO primaries
without first reregistering as an LPO member or as an independent.
73
Thus the Court hypothesized that, in absence of Oklahoma's semi-closed primary
law, the LPO's primaries could be swamped by voters registered as members of other
parties in a manner that could produce nominees indifferent or hostile to traditional LPO
principles. 74 If this happened, the LPO's true members would be harmed and persons
who vote on the basis of candidates' parties could no longer rely on party labels to
signify candidates' ideologies. 75  Moreover, the Court held that it would defeat the
purpose of party registration-providing "'a minimal demonstration by the voter that he
has some "commitment" to the party in whose primary he wishes to participate"' 76 -
because party "commitment is lessened if party members may retain their registration in
one party while voting in another party's primary. '77 Accordingly, the Court held that
the possibility that these harms will occur is reduced, and therefore political parties are
preserved as viable and identifiable interest groups, by Oklahoma's semi-closed primary
preventing persons from voting in LPO primaries while still registered as members of
other parties.
78
After stating its belief that "parties' voter turnout efforts depend in large part on
accurate voter registration rolls," 79 the Court simply asserted without further analysis
that "[w]hen voters are no longer required to disaffiliate before participating in other
parties' primaries, voter registration rolls cease to be an accurate reflection of voters'
political preferences. This is harmful to the important interest of enhancing parties'
electioneering and party-building efforts, said the Court, because parties may "[expend]
precious resources to turn out party members who may have decided to cast their votes
elsewhere." 81  The inference to be drawn from this finding is that Oklahoma's
semi-closed primary law makes voter registration rolls significantly more accurate in
terms of reflecting the likelihood that voters registered as a member of a particular party
will actually turn out to vote in that party's primaries if they are encouraged to do so.
82
70. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
71. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2039 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 735).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2039-41.
74. Id. at 2039.
75. Id.





81. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2040 (emphasis added).
82. Or, in the Court's words, "[i]f encouraging citizens to vote is an important state interest, then Oklahoma
is entitled to protect parties' ability to plan their primaries for a stable group of voters." Id. (citation omitted).
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Finally, the Court held that Oklahoma's semi-closed primary helps prevent
party-raiding and sore loser candidacies by "discouraging voters from temporarily
defecting from another party to vote in the LPO primary. ' '83 For purposes of this
discussion, the Court defined party raiding as "the organized switching of blocs of voters
from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other party's primary
election." 84 The Court then hypothesized that party raiding could be used by one major
party whose primary results were not in doubt to get loyal party members to vote in the
LPO primary for the LPO candidate most likely to siphon off votes from the candidate of
the other major party during the general election. 85  The Court defined sore loser
candidacies by hypothesizing that a prospective major-party primary candidate who
determines that he is unlikely to win his party's primary might file instead as an LPO
primary candidate in hopes that his supporters from the major party will vote for him in
the LPO primary.86  If successful, the sore loser could spoil the general election
prospects of the major party from whom he or she defected. 87 The Court deemed these
potential harms to be incidents of "party-splintering and excessive factualism" that
Oklahoma's semi-closed primary could discourage.
88
III. THE COURT'S QUESTIONABLE LOGIC
A. Political Realities
The authority of states to regulate elections is well established, "for the
Constitution grants to the States a broad power to prescribe the 'Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,' which power is matched
by state control over the election process for state offices." 89 In exercise of this power,
toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century,
states enacted mandatory primary election laws as a reform instigated to take the power
of nominating party candidates away from small factions of allegedly corrupt party
bosses and give it to rank-and-file registered party members.
90
Nominating general election candidates by primary elections, rather than by party
conventions, creates conflicts over the principles and messages of political parties.
Political parties have internal procedures for selecting party officers at all levels, local,
state, and federal. 9 1 Only the party elites and activists participate in the party officer
83. Id. at 2040-41.
84. Id. at 2040 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id.
86. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2040.
87. Id. at 2040-41.
88. Id. at 2041 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217 (quoting U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1) (citation omitted).
90. Gary D. Allison, Protecting Party Purity in the Selection of Nominees for Public Office: The Supremes
Strike Down California's Blanket Primaries and Endanger the Open Primaries of Many States, 36 Tulsa
L.J. 59, pt. II(A) (2000).
91. See Democratic National Committee, The Charter and The Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the
United States, http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/vOO /democratic 1 .download.akamai.com/8082/pdfs/200601 19_
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selection process.92  In turn, the decisions of party officers determine each party's
organizational structure and official policy principles and priorities.93 In the days when
parties nominated their candidates through nominating conventions, candidates were
more tightly connected to party principles and priorities since they were developed by
the few activists and party bosses who controlled the nomination process.
94
The dynamics of primary elections have spawned self-anointed candidates, many
of whom portray themselves as independent of their political parties.9 5 These candidates
have incentives to give only lip service to party principles and priorities, and the party
activists who developed them. They can, and increasingly must, acquire a significant
portion of the resources they need for expensive primary campaigns from political action
committees, wealthy power brokers, and interest groups.96  Ultimately, they must
acquire primary votes from many nominal party members who are not party elites or
National Committee, The Rules of the Republican Party as Adopted by the 2004 Republican National
Convention August 30, 2004, http://www.gop.com/about/aboutread.aspxabouttype=4 (2004).
92. For example, Tulsa County has about 139,000 registered Democrats. Oklahoma State Election Board,
Registration by Party as of January 15, 2005, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/reg_0105.pdf (Jan. 15, 2005).
There are 262 precincts in Tulsa County. Id. Within the Tulsa County Democratic Party, each precinct is
entitled to elect three officers who, along with a few public and state party officers, are entitled to vote for
county officers. Oklahoma Democratic Party, Constitution and Bylaws, art. 11, § 3(B), art. IV, §§ 1-2 (2004).
Assuming every precinct sent a full compliment of officers to the county convention, at most about 786 Tulsa
County Democrats would vote for county officers and delegates to the district and state conventions. From its
Convention, Tulsa County Democrats send about 78 delegates to the district and state conventions. Id. at
art. 11, §§ 4-5, art. IV, § 2(B)(2) (setting forth a formula for calculating each county's share of 528 district and
state delegates based on a county's vote for Democratic presidential, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial
candidates). At the state convention, 528 Democrats out of the state's approximately 1.1 million registered
Democrats vote to elect state party officers. Id. art. IV, § 2(B)(2); Oklahoma State Election Board, supra, at
http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/reg_0105.pdf.
93. The Constitution of Oklahoma's Democratic Party confers authority to propose, enact, and implement
policy resolutions and changes in Democratic Party governance on various levels of party organization from
the precincts to the State Central Committee. Oklahoma Democratic Party, Constitution and Bylaws, art. VII,
§ I(E), § 2(E), (H), (1), § 3(D)-(E), § 4(D)-(E), § 5(C), (E), § 6(B)-(E), § 7(B).
94. See Allison, supra n. 90, at 61-62, 61 n. 21; John C. Green, The Right to Party: The United States
Supreme Court and Contemporary Political Parties, in Superintending Democracy: The Courts and the
Political Process 149, 152 (Christopher P. Banks & John C. Green eds., U. Akron Press 2001); see also
Reichley, supra n. 2, at 174-76 (describing city political machines in their heyday, and the great influence
party bosses had over public officials from their parties).
95. See Green, supra n. 94, at 153-55. The phenomenon of the self-anointed candidate has been described
as the product of economic market forces having an increased impact on politics. Peter Kobrak, Cozy Politics:
Political Parties, Campaign Finance, and Compromised Governance 64-65 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002).
According to Kobrak, there has been an "historical shift from party-based organizations tied to partisan
newspapers to candidate-based membership enterprises heavily dependent on purchasing TV and radio time."
Id. at 64. Under these conditions, "candidates' fortunes no longer rest on the approval of party leaders." Id.
Instead, candidates have become "self-recruited entrepreneurs [who win] 'through a combination of ambition,
talent, and the willingness to devote whatever time [is] necessary to seek and hold office."' Id. (footnote
omitted). As a consequence, "these entrepreneurs.., build their own enterprises and become beholden to their
own donors." Id. This means "[p]residential and congressional candidates ... must each strike their own
political bargains de novo on each issue, and are less likely to represent a broad party position." Kobrak,
supra, at 65.
96. For a particularly good description of the roles interest groups, wealthy donors, and political action
committees play in determining the outcome of elections, see Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 65-69 (describing the
role of interest groups dedicated to narrow issues and priorities in turning out voters who share their goals); id
at 109-25 (describing the significance of money from interest groups, wealthy donors, and political action
committees in political campaigns). These important sources of money have been labeled the "second
constituency," id. at 125, by political scientists and journalists. Id. Kobrak contends that "[t]he second
constituency really delivers. While elections are often closer now, in 1996 House races, the candidate who
raised the most money won 92 percent of the time; in the Senate races, they won 88 percent of the time." Id.
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party activists. 9 7 Major contributors and party activists tend to have positions on issues
that are significantly different than those of nominal party' members. 98 Party activists
and major contributors tend to be closer on major issues than they are to nominal party
members, 99 but the major contributors seem to have greater capacity than party activists
to assert effective pressure on officeholders to support their interests, and their interests
are likely to be narrower and more venal than those of party activists. 
100
Voter turnout is significantly lower in primary elections than general
elections. 10 1 This fact somewhat mitigates the problem of free-range candidates, since
97. Primary elections at minimum permit every registered voter within a particular district, city, county, or
state to vote in the primary elections of the parties of which they are members. This is the so-called closed
primary system. Allison, supra n. 90, at 59-60. The total number of voters who vote in a party's primary
vastly exceeds the number of activists and campaign contributors who also participate. For example, only 528
party officers comprise the Oklahoma Democratic Convention, which is the body that makes decisions about
the policies and principles of the Oklahoma Democratic Party. See supra n. 92. Financial contributors
comprise only about "4 percent of the people." Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 120 (footnote omitted). These are very
small numbers compared to the approximately 350,000 Democrats who participated in the 2002 U.S. Senate
and Gubernatorial Democratic Party Primaries in Oklahoma. Oklahoma State Election Board, Governor:
Democratic Primary Election-August 27, 2002, at 21, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/02dempri.pdf (2002).
98. "[P]arty elites have more intense and consistent opinions than partisans in the mass public." John C.
Green, John S. Jackson & Nancy L. Clayton, Issues Networks and Party Elites in 1996, in The State of the
Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties 105, 106 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea
eds., 3d ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999). This distinction was well illustrated by surveys
conducted for the 1996 National Election Study to determine within the Democratic and Republican Parties the
views of national convention delegates, campaign contributors, voters, and non-voters on four key issues: (1)
the level of government services, (2) health insurance, (3) abortion, and (4) aid to minorities. Id. at 109-12,
111 tbl. 7.3, 112 tbl. 7.4.
Among Democrats, support for continuing government services was significantly higher for convention
delegates (79%) and donors (68%), than among voters (37%) and non-voters (40%). Id. at Ill tbl. 7.3.
Similarly, support for government provided health care insurance was significantly higher among Democratic
convention delegates (71%) and donors (70%), than among Democratic voters (49%) and non-voters (45%).
Id. With respect to abortion, support for the pro-choice position was dramatically higher among Democratic
convention delegates (82%) and donors (90%), than among Democratic voters (52%) and non-voters (43%).
Id. at 112 tbl. 7.4. Finally, support for aid to minorities was much higher among Democratic convention
delegates (68%) and donors (54%), than among Democratic voters (25%) and non-voters (25%). Green,
Jackson & Clayton, supra, at 112 tbl. 7.4.
Among Republicans, support for reducing government services was significantly higher for convention
delegates (88%) and donors (82%), than among voters (60%) and non-voters (40%). Id. at Ill tbl. 7.3.
Similarly, support for private sector health care insurance was significantly higher among Republican
convention delegates (90%) and donors (77%), than among Republican voters (62%) and non-voters (36%).
Id. With respect to abortion, support for the pro-choice position was dramatically lower among Republican
convention delegates (19%), than among Republican donors (35%), voters (32%), and non-voters (41%). Id.
at 112 tbl. 7.4. There was more agreement, however, on the issue of support for aid to minorities-the
percentages favoring such aid were Republican convention delegates (I 1%), donors ( 1%), voters (5%) and
non-voters (11%), while the percentages opposing such aid were Republican convention delegates (76%),
donors (40%), voters (73%), and non-voters (60%). Id.
99. See supra n. 98 and accompanying text.
100. Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 65-69 (describing the interests and tactics of interest groups); id at 125-33
(describing the access and policy rewards expected by major contributors, and the pressures they can bring to
bear on officeholders to get them).
101. For example, during the 2002 election cycle in Oklahoma, there were about 1.090 million registered
Democrats and 0.743 million registered Republicans on primary day, which was August 27, 2002. Oklahoma
State Election Board, Voter Registration as of January 15, 2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/vr_01 02.pdf
(2002); Oklahoma State Election Board, Voter Registration as of November 1, 2002, http://www.state.ok.us/
-elections/vr_l 102.pdf (2002) (the registration figures were estimated by adding the registration totals on these
two reports and dividing them by two). In the Democratic primaries, about 0.35 million Democrats voted in
the gubernatorial and U.S. Senate primaries, for a turnout rate of 32.1%. Oklahoma State Election Board,
Governor: Democratic Primary Election-August 27, 2002, supra n. 97; Oklahoma State Election Board,
United States Senator: Democratic Primary Election-August 27, 2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/
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primary voters tend to be more ideological than general election voters. 102 Faced with
the imperatives of first getting their party's nomination, and then attracting a winning
majority or plurality vote in the general election, candidates must tread a fine line in
offering the primary electorate enough partisan rhetoric to get nominated without
adopting issues positions that could turnoff the less partisan general election
electorate.103 This issues dilemma gives candidates an incentive to make elections about
personal issues such as competency and character so that they can win their primaries
without addressing controversial issues. 104 More often than not, the conflicts created by
02dempri.pdf (2002). In the Republican gubernatorial primary, about 0.206 million Republicans voted for a
turnout rate of 27.7%. Oklahoma State Election Board, Governor: Republican Primary Election-August 27,
2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/02reppri.pdf (2002). By contrast, on election day, November 5, 2002,
there were about 2.068 million registered voters, Oklahoma State Election Board, Voter Registration as of
November 1, 2002, supra, and about 1.036 million votes were cast in the governor's race for a turnout rate
of 50.1%, Oklahoma State Election Board, Governor: General Election-November 5, 2002, http://
www.state.ok.us/-elections/02gov.pdf (2002), while 1.018 million votes were cast in the U.S Senate race for a
turnout of 49.2%, Oklahoma State Election Board, United States Senator: General Election-November 5,
2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/02ussen.pdf (2002). In between the primary election and the general
election, the Democrats had run-off elections on September 17, 2002, to select their nominees for governor and
senator. About 0.258 million Democrats voted in both the Gubernatorial and U.S. Senate run-offs for a turnout
rate of 23.7%. Oklahoma State Election Board, Governor: Democratic Runoff Primary Election-September
17, 2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/02demrun.pdf (2002); Oklahoma State Election Board, United
States Senator: Democratic Runoff Primary Election-September 17, 2002, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/
02demrun.pdf (2002).
102. In Jones, 530 U.S. 567, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a California Blanket Primary law, in part,
because it was designed to produce party nominees who were more moderate than nominees that had been
selected through closed primaries. Id. at 580-81. To support this outcome, the Court cited expert testimony
that party nominees in states that used blanket primaries, in which every voter can choose to vote in a party's
primaries irrespective of their party membership, were more moderate in their views than party nominees
selected in primaries in which only party members can vote. Id. at 580. Some political science research has
determined that "[t]hose legislators whose states hold closed primaries.. . have more ideologically extreme
voting records than legislators whose states have semiclosed or open primaries because candidates in
semiclosed or open primaries are trying to garner votes from independent voters or voters from the other
parties." Kristin Kanthak & Jeffrey Williams, Parties and Primaries: The First Electoral Round, in Law and
Election Politics: The Rules of the Game 7, 11 (Matthew J. Streb ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2005).
However, there is also some evidence that purely open primaries produce the more ideologically extreme
candidates, possibly because cross-over voters from another party vote for the most extreme candidate so as to
saddle the party with a nominee who is less likely to win the general election. Id
103. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 579-81, where the Court describes the likelihood that in closed primaries,
candidates will have to offer more ideologically extreme positions to win the primary, positions that a more
moderate general electorate may not favor. See also Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz & Holly
Brasher, Policy Issues and Electoral Democracy, in Electoral Democracy 172, 179-96 (Michael B.
MacKuen & George Rabinowitz eds., U. Mich. Press 2003), in which two candidate strategies for selecting
issues positions are contrasted: The proximity strategy, in which the candidate tries to adopt positions that most
closely conform to the median position around which most voters are clustered, and the directional strategy, in
which the candidate tries to define him- or herself clearly as being on a particular side by adopting a position
that is the strongest he or she can adopt without being labeled an extremist. With respect to which strategy
seems to work the best, the authors state that "[v]oters at distal positions on the scale react more strongly to
candidates than do voters at more central positions," id. at 177, so that on any particular issue candidates who
fail to adopt positions strong enough to attract the distal voters make that issue irrelevant. Id. As to which
strategy is the most effective, the authors simply note that "it is striking that Republican candidates at least
since Reagan have been fairly determinedly directional, while only Clinton of recent Democrats has followed a
similar directional strategy." Id. at 196. Given that primary voters are more ideological than general election
voters, it follows that the key to winning is for the candidate to adopt positions that are extreme enough to win
the primary but are not so extreme as to get him or her labeled as an extremist.
104. Kobrak notes that in order to maximize their potential for winning during the 1990s, parties "sought to
avoid discussing several potentially divisive issues that cut across their group coalitions." Kobrak, supra n. 95,
at 61. Further, in describing the role of the media in recent campaigns, Kobrak cites a study in which it was
asserted that "a major consequence of the 'media politics' era [is that] 'the candidate as a personality has
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the issues dilemma produce candidates whose issues positions or personalities are not
well-liked by the party elites, the primary electorate, or the general election electorate.
10 5
The ability of, and the perceived need for, candidates to campaign in ways that
contradict or obscure party principles and policies negate the ability of political parties to
be ideal organizers of elections. Party principles and priorities optimally reflect the
visions of their elite activists for how government can best meet the needs of the people,
visions that are moderated only to the extent necessary to attract a winning coalition of
contributors, volunteers, and voters. 10 6 Ideally, elections should be about presenting
these moderated optimal visions clearly to the voters so their votes communicate their
policy wishes to those who hold public office. 107 For reasons stated above, elections in
the United States often are driven by the personal issues of competency and character, or
involve candidates who feel free to espouse positions at variance with their parties'
visions of governing. So, political reality simply does not match the political ideal, and
voters may not be able to rely on party labels as indicators of the clear policy choices at
stake in each election.
become the primary consideration at the presidential level."' Id. at 63. Professor Theodore Lowi has
contended that the two major parties have become so immobilized by wedge issues which divide their
constituencies no matter what position is taken that they have sought to focus campaigns on assertions of
scandal rather than on real issues. Lowi, Prospects and Obstacles, supra n. 13, at 8.
105. Professors Bibby and Maisel have documented that the public rates officeholders and politicians well
below persons engaged in other professions. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 85, 85 tbl. 4.1. They offer several
reasons for the public's great dissatisfaction with our political system. First, the parties have nominated
persons whose personalities were not well-liked by the public. Id. at 84-85. Second, candidates have
increasingly mn on the simple issue that government is bad, thereby magnifying voters' dissatisfaction with
government, officeholders, and politicians. Id. at 85-86. Third, voters complain of excessive partisan
bickering. Id. at 86-87. Finally, politicians have created disappointment even when they have addressed real
issues because these issues are so complex that meaningful solutions to them have eluded the political system.
Id. at 87-88.
Kobrak offers a slightly different analysis of why there has been so much dissatisfaction with general
election candidates. Specifically, he asserts that the public has been distanced from candidates by the
candidates seeking to satisfy the demands of ideological wealthy donors, assertive grass-roots organizations,
and special interests in order to accumulate campaign resources and to avoid the opposition of politically
effective organizations. Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 91-95. The demands candidates must satisfy include taking
ideological positions that may be at variance with those of the general public and party activists and promising
to provide economic benefits, tax exemptions, and regulatory exemptions to special interests. Id.
106. As Kobrak stated:
When functioning ideally, a party... constitutes the only voluntary organization in the United
States that aspires to accept everyone in its membership, attempts to make decisions designed to
withstand the test of time, and plays the critical governance role of sustaining the election period,
the transfer of power, and the making of public policy.
Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 57. By seeking to be viable politically over the long-term, parties "must be answerable
for the quality of their decisions" so as to "[increase] the likelihood that they will seek solutions closer to the
public interest." Id. at 56. "By remaining inclusive, parties also serve as an obstacle to factional domination of
government." Id. at 56-57. By representing the view of their members, parties form critical links between
citizens and the government. Id. at 58. These links "[provide] an opportunity for voters to express their
preferences through their party intermediaries, and it allows the elites to explain and-particularly where they
find it necessary to depart from majority views-justify their policy stands to the citizens." Id. at 58-59.
Parties must take care, however, that in the zeal of representing their members, especially their activist
members, they do not alienate themselves from the general election electorate. Kobrak, supra n. 95, at 90-91.
Evidence from real life politics demonstrates that parties and their leaders have often taken pragmatic steps to
moderate their views in the interest of winning elections. Id.
107. Id. at 95, at 59. This ideal is difficult to attain, for the "very process of dichotomizing and simplifying
issues will necessarily encourage a politics in which symbolism often dominates substance." Macdonald,
Rabinowitz & Brasher, supra n. 103, at 197.
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Moreover, the potential for voters to be misled by party labels is magnified by the
United States' federalist form of government, which has caused party organizations to
evolve at three different levels: national, state, and local. 10 8 A party's national platform
and candidate for President may be unpopular in many states. 10 9 As a consequence, in
such states the party's candidates and officeholders may not support its national platform
and/or its presidential nominee. 1 10 To the extent that voters in such states label a party
by its national platform and presidential nominee, and then vote on the basis of party
labels, a party's state and local candidates are likely to be rejected even though they offer
policy choices that are quite different from those offered by the party's presidential
nominee.' On the other hand, voters who are aware of these policy differences may
108. Green, supra n. 94, at 151-52.
109. Indeed, in 2004, Democratic candidates and officeholders faced potentially hostile political
environments in the reddest pro-Bush states as did Republican candidates and officeholders in the bluest
pro-Kerry states. President Bush's reddest states include one in which he received over 70% of the vote-
Utah-three in which he received 66-69% of the vote-Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming-and six in which he
received 61-66% of the vote-Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas. USA Today,
Election 2004: Results by State, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/front.htm (accessed Sept. 25,
2005). John Kerry's bluest states include two in which he received 60-62% of the vote-Massachusetts and
Rhode Island. Id.
110. For example, in 2004, Lincoln Chafee, a moderate Republican U.S. senator from Rhode Island stated
that he might leave the Republican Party if President Bush were re-elected. USA Today, Election 2004: Sen.
Chafee Considers Leaving the GOP, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/ussenate/2004-11-
03-ri-chaffee x.htm (Nov. 3, 2004).
The Republican senator said it would have been impossible to vote for President Bush given their
opposite views on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, the deficit, tax cuts, the environment and
the war in Iraq.
Chafee has opposed the administration's push to drill in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and
has criticized Bush's handling of the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. He was the only Republican
senator to vote against the October 2002 resolution that gave Bush the authority to invade Iraq.
Id.
At the 2004 Republican National Convention, Zell Miller, a conservative Democrat U.S. senator from
Georgia (which gave President Bush 58% of its vote), gave the keynote address. In his speech, Senator Miller
said: "There is but one man to whom I am willing to entrust their future and that man's name is George Bush."
CBS News, Text of Zell Miller's RNC Speech, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/0I/politics/
main640299.shtm (Sept. 1, 2004). In explaining his opposition to his party and its presidential candidate,
Senator John Kerry, Miller complained: "Now, while young Americans are dying in the sands of Iraq and the
mountains of Afghanistan, our nation is being torn apart and made weaker because of the Democrat's manic
obsession to bring down our Commander in Chief." Id. He went on to assert: "Motivated more by partisan
politics than by national security, today's Democratic leaders see America as an occupier, not a liberator." Id
Turning his criticism to John Kerry, he assailed Senator Kerry's voting record on national defense:
And, no pair has been more wrong, more loudly, more often than the two Senators from
Massachusetts, Ted Kennedy and John Kerry.
Together, Kennedy/Kerry have opposed the very weapons system that won the Cold War and that is
now winning the War on Terror.
Listing all the weapon systems that Senator Kerry tried his best to shut down sounds like an
auctioneer selling off our national security but Americans need to know the facts.
Id.
11. In the 2004 Oklahoma U.S. Senate race, the Democratic nominee, Congressman Brad Carson, ran a
decidedly conservative campaign that was very supportive of President Bush. As an example of Congressman
Carson's conservative campaign, when he and Dr. Coburn appeared on Meet the Press it was reported:
At times it was hard to tell who was the Democrat and who was the Republican in what has shaped
up as one of the most important Senate races in the country.
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consciously vote to elect public officials who are members of the President's party and
opposed to the policy preferences of the President. 112 If this occurs in enough states, the
President's party may have great difficulty governing in a coherent manner even if it has
achieved a majority within the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. 113
During the post-World War II era, the party who has won the presidency has often
failed to win a majority in both houses of Congress. 114  Critics have charged that
Oklahoma's Senate candidates faced off on NBC's 'Meet the Press' on Sunday, with Rep. Brad
Carson (D) repeatedly embracing GOP policies and President Bush.
Lois Romano, Turnabout in Okla. Senate Race: Democrat Carson backs Iraq War; Deficit Worries GOP's
Coburn, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4518-20040ct3.html (Oct. 4, 2004). On the key
issue of the Iraq war, Congressman Carson proclaimed that "'I supported the president and the resolution when
it came through Congress,' Carson said. 'I believe that our success in Iraq is critical to our future. And I
believe that, if anything, we should be more vigorous in destroying the sanctuaries that terrorists have carved
out for themselves."' Id. He also noted that he disagreed with Senator Kerry's statement that Iraq was "a
'wrong' war." Id. During the campaign, Congressman Carson ran a campaign advertisement that was highly
offensive to Oklahoma liberals. In it, Congressman Carson's wife, Julie, complains that "'During this race,
Tom Coburn called my husband evil, then dangerous, now a liberal'.... 'I don't know what's worse."'
Commercial Closet Association, Evil, Then Dangerous, Now a Liberal, http://www.connercialcloset.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/portrayals.html?record=2050 (accessed Sept. 25, 2005). Despite the conservatism of his campaign,
Congressman Carson lost decisively to Dr. Cobum, 52.77% to 41.24%, with an unknown Independent
candidate getting 5.99%. Oklahoma State Election Board, General Election November 2, 2004: Summary
Results, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/04ussen.pdf (2004).
112. In the 2000 U.S. Senate elections, Lincoln Chafee won re-election in predominantly Democratic Rhode
Island and James Jeffords won re-election in predominantly liberal Vermont as George W. Bush was
"winning" the presidency. Both men are moderate to progressive Republicans, and they won as a decidedly
conservative Republican won the presidency. See John DeVries, A Smudged Crystal Ball, 1 USA Political
Research 54 (Nov. 14, 2000) (available at http://balderdashe.com/usapol/archives/voll/VI-54.html). President
Bush had been in office only about four months when differences between him and Senator Jeffords became so
heated that Senator Jeffords left the Republican Party to become an Independent, thereby giving control of the
U.S. Senate to the Democrats. CNN, Jeffords leaves GOP, throwing Senate control to Democrats, http://
archives.cnn.com/200 l/ALLPOLITICS/05/24/jeffords.senate/ (May 24, 2001).
113. Indeed, under certain circumstances, just one defector can throttle a major presidential initiative. Even
before he left the Republican Party, Senator Jeffords had already damaged President Bush's domestic agenda:
"Many Republicans believe Jeffords single-handedly sank Bush's proposed tax cut, forcing the White House to
negotiate with moderate Democrats on a smaller cut." CNN, supra n. 112. As noted above, Senator Jeffords
leaving the Republican Party greatly harmed the Republican agenda because it gave control of the U.S. Senate
to the Democratic Party. Id. With respect to this change, one White House official said that "It just shows how
we have much less influence in controlling the agenda than many people think." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
114. There have been fifteen completed presidential terms since the end of World War II in 1945. In only
four of these presidential terms-Truman (1949-1953), Kennedy/Johnson (1961-1965), Johnson (1965-1969),
and Carter (1977-1981)--has the President enjoyed having both Houses of Congress controlled by his party
throughout the four year term. In contrast, there were five presidential terms where the President endured a
Congress completely controlled by the opposition party through out the term--Eisenhower 11 (1957-1961),
Nixon (1969-1973), Nixon/Ford (1973-1977), G.H.W. Bush (1989-1993), and Clinton 11 (1997-2001). In
three presidential terms, the President's party controlled both Houses for two years, and the opposition party
controlled both Houses for two years-Roosevelt/Truman (1945-1949), Eisenhower 1 (1953-1957), and
Clinton 1 (1993-1997). In one presidential term the President's party controlled the Senate for two years and
the House throughout, and the opposition party controlled the Senate for two years-G.W. Bush I
(2001-2005). In one presidential term the President's party controlled the Senate, and the opposition party
controlled the House-Reagan I (1981-1985). Finally, in one presidential term the President's party controlled
the Senate for two years and the opposition party controlled the House throughout, and the Senate for two
years-Reagan 11 (1985-1989). Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Party Divisions,
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/CongressionalHistory/partyDiv.html (accessed Sept. 27, 2005); U.S. Senate,
Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one item-and teasers/
partydiv.htm (accessed Sept. 27, 205); see also Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 39 tbl. 2.2.
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"divided government [caused] stagnation and the inability to get things done."1 15 Not
only has our government been afflicted with division, it has also endured more instability
than would have been expected from a government dominated by two stable parties.
116
B. Legal Background
Clingman was not decided in a legal vacuum. Rather, it was the latest law-making
event to add to the body of law, both statutory and judicial, that has greatly influenced
the electoral prospects of third parties and the relative rights of voters, candidates, and
parties to shape primary elections and determine their outcomes.
1. Third-Party Obstacles
Perhaps the most significant legal obstacle to third-party electoral success is the
U.S. preference for electing legislators, state and federal, from single-member plurality
winner take-all districts. 117  In such districts, there can be only one winner.118  As a
consequence, this electoral pressure virtually dictates that two broad-based parties will
form, since only large broad-based parties are likely to muster the plurality vote needed
to win a significant number of legislative seats. 1 19 Third parties often are created to
promote a specific ideology, 12° or to launch a protest movement concerning specific
115. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 86. In the worst case scenario, a divided government can lead to
budgetary impasses that shutdown the government, as it did in late 1995 when President Clinton and Congress
deadlocked over budget policy and the Republicans' use of budget bills to force through regulatory legislation
it could not get past a Clinton veto outside of the budgetary process. Mr. Clinton Wields the Veto, 145 N.Y.
Times A24 (Nov. 14, 1995); Todd S. Purdum, President and G.O.P. Agree to End Federal Shutdown and to
Negotiate a Budget, 145 N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 20, 1995); Don Van Natta, Jr., Bracing for Furloughs and
Locked Offices, 145 N.Y. Times B1O (Nov. 14, 1995).
116. Commencing with the Kennedy administration, the nation endured five straight presidencies that were
either interrupted prematurely by tragedy or scandal, or were deemed by voters to be failures for their inability
to solve pressing national problems. These presidencies included the Kennedy administration, which ended
due to President Kennedy's assassination; the Johnson administration, which was brought down by its inability
to deal with the Vietnam War and increasing domestic disorder; the Nixon administration, which was brought
down by the Watergate scandal; the Ford Interregnum, which was rejected by voters because of its inability to
deal well with economic problems and resentment over President Ford's pardon of President Nixon; and the
Carter administration, which voters rejected over its difficulty in handling a major energy crisis, economic
problems, and the Iranian Hostage Crisis. For an illuminating and quite readable history of these flawed
administrations, read Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan (Free
Press 1990).
In addition, the Reagan administration was marred by the Iran-Contra scandal, id. at 658-60, and the
Clinton administration was marred by a sex scandal that led to President Clinton's impeachment, but not a
conviction, William Jefferson Clinton, Bill Clinton: My Life, at passim (Alfred A Knopf 2004). Although the
Reagan and Clinton scandals did not result in interrupted presidencies, in each case they weakened the
administration's ability to pursue its agenda. See Barone, supra, at 660 (describing the Iran-Contra Scandal's
effects on the Reagan administration); Clinton, supra, at passim.
117. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 56-57.
118. Id. at56.
119. Id.
120. Examples of such doctrinaire or ideological parties include: The Prohibition Party, the Socialist Party,
the Socialist Labor Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the Communist Party, the American Nazi Party, and the
Libertarian Party. Gillespie, supra n. 5, at 10. Bibby and Maisel include the Conservative Party and the
Peace & Freedom Party in the doctrinaire category. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 13-14. Closely related to
the doctrinaire parties are what Bibby and Maisel have labeled as "new parties," which "appeal to voters
around.., issues that reflect differences in cultural more than economic ideologies." Id. at 14. These "new
parties" include the Libertarian Party, the Green Party, the Natural Law Party, and the Right-to-Life Party. Id.
20051
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grievances with the two major parties. 12 1 Such parties have simply been too narrow in
their orientation to achieve a winning plurality. 122  This is especially true in a nation
such as the United States where the electorate is remarkably non-ideological, 123 and the
modest ideological differences that exist are accommodated by the dominant parties.
124
Moreover, the repeated inability of third parties to win significant numbers of legislative
seats may cause potential adherents to feel their votes for third-party candidates are
wasted and could facilitate the victory of the major-party candidate they least prefer. 1
25
121. Gillespie adopts V.0. Key's notion of "recurring, shortlived ... party eruptions" to describe these
parties. Gillespie, supra n. 5, at II (internal quotation marks omitted, ellipses in original). He includes in this
category the Antimasons, Free Soilers, Populists, Progressives, Dixiecrats, Know Nothings, and American
Independents. Id. Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Progressives, La Follette Progressives, George Wallace's
American Independents, and Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats were launched to give voice to the intense policy
differences of a major political figure with his former party. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 13; Gillespie,
supra n. 5, at 11.
122. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 54-55.
123. Bibby and Maisel comment that:
American society is not characterized by blocs of people irreconcilably attracted to a particular
ideology or creed. Racial, religious, and ethnic minorities ... have not tended toward separatism or
extremism. Religious tensions have existed, but open conflict has never been
commonplace .... Nor has America developed the degree of class consciousness that can be found
in Europe. .... There is virtually universal acceptance and support for the existing constitutional
order and a capitalist economic system.
Id. at 55.
There is also the very real question as to whether U.S. voters have the capacity or inclination to think in
ideological terms. Philip Converse "concluded that most Americans are innocent of ideology, ill prepared, and
perhaps even incapable of following.., discussions about the direction government should take." Donald R.
Kinder, Belief Systems after Converse, in Electoral Democracy 13, 13 (Michael B. MacKuen & George
Rabinowitz eds., U. Mich. Press 2003). In a remarkable essay that takes up where Converse left off, Kinder
explores orientations voters could use to organize their thinking about politics so as to enable them to cast votes
that register their policy preferences to officeholders. Id. at ch. 1. Kinder concludes that groupcentrism and
ethnocentrism are two orientations that voters seem to use, rather than ideological principles, to form and signal
their political beliefs. Id. at 16-37. At the end of this exploration, Kinder comes to a somewhat pessimistic
conclusion:
Like the ideological principles that Converse looked for but could not find, groupcentrism and
ethnocentrism hold out the promise of a general solution to the puzzle of public opinion, but not
necessarily an inspiring one. That public opinion is real and that it is organized in systematic and
knowable ways does not necessarily make it, or the policies that it influences, enlightened.
Id. at 40.
124. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 55-56. There have been several periods where third parties achieved
significant support. Marjorie Randon Hershey, Third Parties: The Power of Electoral Laws and Institutions, in
Law and Election Politics: The Rules of the Game 23, 25-26, 25 fig. 3.1, 26 fig. 3.2 (Matthew J. Streb ed.,
Lynne Rienner Publishers 2005). During one heyday, most third-party "votes were cast for Populist and
Progressive candidates. But the Democratic Party soon absorbed the main ideas of the 1890s Populists and
therefore undermined their appeal to voters." Id at 25. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Republican Party reached
out to supporters of H. Ross Perot, and his Reform Party soon faded. Id. at 25-26.
It has been suggested that the continuing dominance of U.S. politics by two parties reflects an essential
duality of ideology within the American electorate. Reichley, supra n. 2, at 3-4. This duality is comprised to
two traditions, the liberal tradition and the republican tradition. Id. at 3. "Both traditions cherish individual
freedom as a fundamental human value." Id. They diverge in the emphasis they give to particular types of
freedoms. "[T]he republican tradition has particularly advocated freedoms that are least likely to conflict with
public order, specifically economic freedoms; and the liberal tradition has specifically championed freedoms
that are most likely to be compatible with equality, notably freedoms of personal behavior and expression." Id
at 4. Given this ideological duality, Reichley suggests that "a two-party system representing these two
traditions is in this sense natural to our politics." Id
125. Theodore J. Lowi, Toward a Responsible Three-Party System: Plan or Obituary? in The State of the
Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties 171, 172 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea
eds., 3d ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999).
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In contrast, third parties tend to emerge and have staying power in jurisdictions
that establish multimember, proportionate-representation districts. 126  Under such an
arrangement, a party can finish third or fourth and still pick up a fair share of legislative
seats.127 The ability to win consistently a fair share of legislative seats not only enables
third parties to attract and maintain an ideologically driven membership, 128 it also
provides third parties with leverage to shape policy and bargain for executive offices for
their members whenever their legislative strength constitutes the balance of power on
important policy matters.
129
Our dominant parties have reinforced their duopoly by engaging in increasingly
sophisticated political gerrymandering during the process of reapportioning 
voters.
130
As a result, a huge portion of legislative districts, federal and state, have become single
party districts because gerrymandering has provided one party with an overwhelming
percentage of the registered voters. 
131
Political gerrymanders have been challenged by members of parties whose ability
to elect nominees for pubic office have been severely disadvantaged by a
reapportionment plan. 13 2 In these challenges, the plaintiffs contend that the architects of
the political gerrymander intentionally discriminated against them by reducing their
ability to elect a fair share of their party's nominees to pubic 
office.
1 33
Plaintiffs have yet to win the reapportionment remedy they sought in these
cases. 1 3 4 There has been significant support among the Justices for the proposition that
political gerrymanders present non-justiciable political questions
13 5 even though the
Court has held that they do not. 13
6 Moreover, the Justices who have believed that claims
126. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 56.
127. Hershey, supra n. 124, at 28. Multimember districts and proportionate representation systems are
primarily a European phenomenon. Id. However, prior to the mid-1950s, multimember districts were common
in the United States. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Amy, supra n. 13, at 163; Ryden, supra n. 13, at 177.
130. In 2004, none of the 153 contested state legislative seats in California changed hands or parties thanks
to sophisticated reapportionment methods agreed to by the Democratic and Republican incumbents. Jeffrey M.
Barker, Sacramento News & Review: Gerrymander Jigsaw: The Politicians Have Created Safe Districts for
Their Re-election. Now it's Time to Redistrict in a Fair Way, http://www.newsreview.com/issues/sacto/
2005-05-12/cover.asp (accessed Sept. 29, 2005). Gerrymandering has led to a significant decline in
competitive seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Fair Vote: The Center for Voting and Democracy,
Overview: Dubious Democracy 2003-2004 (June 2003), http://www.fairvote.org/dubdem/overview.htm
(accessed Sept. 29, 2005). "In 2002, over 80% of US House races were won by landslide margins of at
least 20%. Fewer than one in ten races were by less than a 10% margin. This year's elections were the least
competitive races since 1988." Id. Worse yet,
[o]ver 90% of Americans live in congressional districts that are essentially one-party monopolies.
This means that most voters are faced with unappealing choices: ratify the incumbent party, waste
their vote on a candidate who is sure to lose, or sit out the race. Not surprisingly, increasing
numbers of American are opting for the latter option.
Id.
131. Barker, supra n. 130.
132. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272-73 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1986).
133. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272-73; Davis, 478 U.S. at 114-14.
134. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-81, 279 n. 5,280 n. 6, 287 n. 8.
135. Id. at 277-306 (plurality); Davis, 478 U.S. at 144-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Burger,
C.J. & Rehnquist, J.).
136. Davis, 478 U.S. at 118-27.
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against political gerrymanders are justiciable have also tended to rule on the merits
against the gerrymander challengers. In doing so, they have established plurality support
for the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause does not command that
reapportionment plans be drawn so that each party may elect a number of officeholders
proportionate to its voting strength in a state. 13 7  Plurality support has also been
established for the proposition that the results of one election are insufficient to establish
a discriminatory effect. 138 Most importantly, a plurality has stated that a gerrymandered
electoral system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it "is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole." 139 In that regard, this plurality opined that it is to be
presumed that individuals who voted for a losing candidate will be adequately
represented by, and "have as much opportunity to influence [the winner,] as other voters
in the district."
' 140
Our federal government is headed by a single executive, the President. 14 1 This
means that in the United States the presidency is the most important political prize.
142
As is the case with single-member legislative districts, the singularity of the presidency
means that realistically only very broad based parties have any chance of electing a
President. 143 The advantage of major parties in presidential politics is reinforced by an
Electoral College comprised of members elected state-by-state on the basis that the
presidential candidate winning a plurality of a state's vote gets all of the state's
electors. 14 4 If electors were awarded on a proportionate vote basis in more than just a
handful of states, third-party candidates could receive enough electoral votes to insure
that no one would achieve the majority of electoral vote needed to avoid having the
President elected by the U.S. House of Representatives. 145 Such elections could give
third-party candidates leverage to bargain with the major-party candidates by offering to
have her electors vote as she directs, in return for policy concessions and executive
branch positions. 
14 6
Third parties have also been hindered greatly by restrictive state ballot access
requirements. In many states, third parties must file ballot access petitions containing
valid signatures of a large number of registered voters in order to be able to nominate
their candidates through primary elections and have their nominees placed on the ballot
137. Id. at 129-37 (plurality).
138. Id. at 135.
139. Id. at 132.
140. Id.
141. U.S. Const., art. 11, § 1.
142. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 57.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 57-58.
145. Amendment XII of the United States Constitution provides that the United States House of
Representatives shall choose the President "from persons having the highest numbers [of electoral votes] not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President." See Reichley, supra n. 2, at 4 (indicating that third
parties are unlikely to get enough electoral votes to through the presidential election into the House of
Representatives as long as states require electors to be elected at large), see also Lowi, supra n. 125, at 179
(suggesting that "the existence of a genuine third party would parliamentarize the presidency [by increasing]
the probability of presidential elections being settled in the House of Representatives").
146. Gillespie, supra n. 5, at 30.
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with their party labels. 14 7 Assuming a party meets this requirement, it may have to do it
all over again for the next election cycle if its candidate for a specified high office fails to
achieve a certain percentage of the vote. 14 8 In addition, the failure of a third party to
maintain its officially recognized status may result in its registered members having their
registrations changed to independent. 14 9  This membership cancellation feature
discourages voters from registering as members of third parties because it forces them to
reregister as a party member during the election cycle if their party once again completes
a successful ballot access petition drive. 150  To add insult to injury, candidates who
choose to run as independents usually face much lower ballot access hurdles than
candidates wanting to run as nominees of third parties. 15 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld such restrictions as reasonable means of advancing the "important state interest in
requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot-the interest, if no other, in
avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the
general election."
' 1 5 2
States have also imposed restrictions on who can be the preferred nominees of
third parties that have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The fusion candidate, a
person who becomes the nominee of two parties-a major party and a third party-is a
147. See Hershey, supra n. 124, at 31-32. For example, Oklahoma requires new parties seeking official
recognition to file valid petitions containing the signatures of at least 5% of the total vote cast in the last
general election for either the governor or the presidential electors. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-108(2) (Supp. 2004).
In 2004, 1,463,758 Oklahomans voted in the presidential general election. Oklahoma State Election Board,
General Election: November 2, 2004, http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/04gen.html (2004). This means a new
party seeking recognition in 2005 would have to file valid petitions containing the signatures of 73,188
registered voters. There is some confusion as to whether a person may appear on the general election ballot as
the nominee of an unrecognized party. Oklahoma law states that candidates may not file to seek the
nomination of party unless they seek to be nominated by a party Oklahoma officially recognizes. Okla. Stat
tit. 26, § 5-104 (2001). Nevertheless, Oklahoma purports to permit candidates of unrecognized parties to be
listed on general election ballots along with their parties' labels beneath the names of candidates nominated by
the recognized parties and above the names of candidates running as independents. Okla. Stat. tit. 26,
§ 6-106 (2001). Only recognized parties may nominate their candidates through primary elections. Okla. Stat.
tit. 26, § 1-102 (Supp. 2004).
148. For example, Oklahoma withdraws its recognition of "[a]ny recognized political party whose nominee
for Governor or nominees for electors for President and Vice President fail to receive at least ten percent (10%)
of the total votes cast for said offices in any General Election ...." Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-109(A) (2001).
Obviously, Oklahoma will not provide long-term recognition of political parties that only operate on a state or
regional basis, since they would lose their recognition after every presidential election for failure to have a
presidential candidate on the Oklahoma general election ballot. Assuming that a party had a candidate for
President on the Oklahoma general election ballot last year, he or she would have had to gamer 146,376 votes
to enable his party to retain its status as an officially recognized party.
149. In Oklahoma, the State Election Board is required to "change to Independent the party affiliation.., of
each registered voter of a political party which ceases to be a recognized political party." Okla. Stat. tit. 26,
§ 1-1 10 (2001).
150. See Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2046 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. In Oklahoma, candidates running as Independents will be listed on the general election ballot if they
just file for the office they seek and either pay the required fee or submit a petition with the qualifying number
of signatures. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, §§ 1-102, 5-105(B) (Supp. 2004). To be a general election candidate as the
nominee of a third party, a candidate must belong to a party that is officially recognized by Oklahoma and then
win her party's primary election. See supra nn. 147-148 and accompanying text.
152. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). Such restrictions could have avoided the circus-type
circumstances of California's 2003 special -election to recall its governor. With very little restrictions in
place, 135 candidates managed to get on the ballot, "including a melon-smashing comedian, a twenty-three-
year-old porn star, a sumo wrestler, and the publisher of Hustler magazine." Hershey, supra n. 124, at 34.
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means by which third parties can gain leverage to affect policy and provide their
members with meaningful voting opportunities. 153  A major party lets its willing
nominee accept a dual nomination because it gives the nominee two lines on the ballot
and the support of another political organization. 154 In return, the nominee articulates
some of the third party's major issues positions and perhaps helps some members of the
third party acquire government positions. 155 Given the United States' virtual rejection of
electing legislators through proportionate representation in multimember districts, "[i]t is
no exaggeration to state that fusion voting is the key to a durable multiparty system."
' 156
Ironically, a movement to outlaw fusion candidacies arose at the beginning of the
twentieth century from concern about the advantages it gave a major party. 157 Now,
over forty states ban the practice.
158
In the late 1990s, there was briefly some hope that bans on fusion candidacies
would be declared unconstitutional violations of parties' and candidates' freedom of
association rights as a result of an Eighth Circuit case striking down Minnesota's fusion
ban. 15 9  This hope was dashed in 1997 by the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal of the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.
16 0
First, the Court held that Minnesota's fusion ban does not severely burden a party's
associational rights. 1 6 1 Parties may nominate anyone they want who will accept their
nominations other than persons who accept the nominations of another party. 16 2 A party
is free to endorse a candidate who has accepted the nomination of another party as long
153. Amy, supra n. 13, at 152-53; Hershey, supra n. 124, at 34-35.
154. See Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 57-58.
155. See id.
156. Amy, supra n. 13, at 153 (quoting Dan Cantor, executive director of the New Party) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, in New York, where fusion has long been permitted, the Liberal and Conservative
Parties have used it to sustain themselves by forging alliances with the Democrats and the Republicans
respectively. Hershey, supra n. 124, at 35.
157. The Democrats used fusion to good advantage from 1897 through 1907, thereby prompting the
Republican Party to lead a movement to ban it. Amy, supra n. 13, at 153.
158. Id.
159. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 198-200 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit
found that the fusion ban severely obstructed the New Party's associational fights to determine its own
nominees, form political alliances, and broaden its base of support. Id. at 198-99. It further found that the ban
was broader than necessary to protect the Minnesota's interest in preventing destabilizing splintering of major
parties since that interest could be met by simply allowing fusion only when the major party assented to it. Id.
at 199. To that end, the Court expressly held that "Minnesota has no authority to protect a major party from
internal discord and splintering resulting from its own decision to allow a minor party to nominate the major
party's candidate." Id. Moreover, the Court extolled the potential advantages of fusion candidacies by opining
that "rather than jeopardizing the integrity of the election system, consensual multiple party nomination may
invigorate it by fostering more competition, participation, and representation in American politics." Id.
Similarly, the Court held that the State's interest in avoiding voter confusion could be met by providing voters
with simple instructions, McKenna, 73 F.3d at 199, that voter reliance on party labels to determine their votes
would not be harmed because fusion would give voters more accurate information about the views of the fusion
candidates, id. at 199-200, that ballot overcrowding was already dealt with by state laws requiring candidates
and parties to demonstrate some "minimum level of support before being placed on the ballot," id. at 200, and
that there would be no confusion about who wins elections because the votes of fusion candidates would
simply be totaled and compared to the votes other candidates receive. Id.
160. 520U.S. 351 (1997).
161. Id. at 359-63.
162. Id. at 360-61, 363.
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as it is willing to support a person who cannot be listed on the ballot as its candidate.
163
The ban does not forbid a party from endorsing a candidate, seeking political alliances,
or "nominat[ing] candidates for office, [or] spread[ing] its message .... " 164 Nor, said
the Court, is a state required to remove reasonable election regulations that as a practical
matter severely disadvantage minor parties. 165 Although the Court acknowledged that
Minnesota's fusion ban prevented the New Party from using the ballot as a means of
communicating to the public support for a particular candidate and accumulating a
message-sending vote for preferred candidates, 166 it nevertheless held that a ban on the
use of the ballot for such purposes was neither an infringement of a protected right nor a
significant burden on a party's ability to function.
167
Next, having found that Minnesota's fusion ban did not severely burden a party's
associational rights, the Court went on to hold that the ban was justified by sufficiently
weighty regulatory interests. 168 In doing so, it noted that it was not necessary for the
State to offer "elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of [its] asserted
justifications." 169 Thus, it accepted at face value Minnesota's contention that fusion
voting could cause voter confusion and ballot overcrowding because the major parties
might create sham new parties with campaign-slogan-like names such as "No New
Taxes" or "Conserve Our Environment" as a way of converting the ballot into "a
billboard for political advertising." 170 Similarly, the Court accepted the State's assertion
that fusion candidacies could permit third parties to achieve unmerited major-party status
by feeding off of "the popularity of another party's candidate."
' 17 1
Finally, and most significantly, the Court held that a state's interest in preserving
the stability of its political system entitles it "to enact reasonable election regulations that
may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system."'172 In this regard, the Court
indicated that provisions shoring up the two-party system will be deemed reasonable as
long as they do not "completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties' or
independent candidates' competition and influence" 173 or constitute a paternalistic
mechanism for "protect[ing] political parties from the consequences of their own internal
disagreements.' 174 The Court found that the fusion ban was a reasonable regulation
related to the legitimate goal of shoring up Minnesota's two-party system. It did so by
noting that the fusion ban is less burdensome on a party's choices of candidates than a
163. Id. at 360.
164. ld. at 360-61.
165. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 361-62.
166. Id. at 362.
167. Id. at 362-63. In this regard, the Court proclaimed that "Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not
as forums for political expression." Id. at 363. Moreover, said the Court, parties are free "to use the ballot to
communicate information about itself and its candidate .... so long as that candidate is not already someone
else's candidate." Id
168. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363-70.
169. Id. at 364.
170. Id. at 365.
171. Id. at 366.
172. Id. at 367 (emphasis added).




Allison: Protecting Our Nation's Political Duopoly: The Supremes Spoil the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005
TULSA LA W REVIEW
regulation it had upheld previously that prohibits candidates from running as
independents or the nominees of a party if they had been affiliated with another party
within year of the current election cycle's primary elections.1
75
The party disaffiliation provision discussed in Timmons was upheld by the Court in
Storer v. Brown.17 6 This restriction was justified, said the Court, because it advanced
the State of California's compelling interest in guarding against the instability that
splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may impose on its political system. 1
77
The Court also said that the restriction was a reasonable means for the State to protect
the integrity of its direct primary process. 1 7 8  Not only does it prevent a person
disgruntled with his party to bypass the party's primary, thereby using the general
election to continue intraparty feuds, 179 it also prevents another party from recruiting
such a person to run as a spoiler Independent candidate.
180
Although the disaffiliation provision upheld in Storer was not structured to hinder
the ability of third parties to nominate candidates capable of attracting significant
election day support, it nevertheless has great potential for shutting down a source of
candidates that historically has been quite important to the success of third-party efforts.
The last four third-party presidential candidates to capture electoral votes-Theodore
Roosevelt, Robert M. La Follette, Strom Thurmond, and George C. Wallace-were each
well-known politicians seeking to press their grievances with their "home" parties by
running third-party campaigns. 18 1 As such, they seem to have launched precisely the
type of campaigns the disaffiliation provision at issue in Storer is designed to prevent.
As noted previously, the advent of the mandatory primary election has reduced the
ability of party elites to control the candidate nomination process and given rise to the
entrepreneurial candidate seeking the nomination with the help of political action
committees and interest groups. 1 8 2  This development has made it possible for party
dissidents to have realistic opportunities to win their parties' nominations as a means of
vindicating their political views.18 3 As a consequence, major-party primaries siphon off
175. Id. at 367-69. In this regard, the Court observed that the party-disaffiliation requirement "limited the
field of candidates by thousands[, while] Minnesota's [fusion ban] precludes only a handful who freely choose
to be so limited." Id. at 369.
176. 415 U.S. 724, 726-38 (1974).
177. Id. at 736.
178. Id. at 735.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Roosevelt bolted the Republican Party to run as the nominee of the Bull-Moose Progressive Party
in 1912 in part because he felt that he was cheated out of becoming the Republican nominee and in part
because he had become ideologically estranged from his successor, William Howard Taft. Gillespie, supra
n. 5, at 85-87. La Follette also left the Republican Party to run as a Progressive Party presidential candidate
in 1924, in part because he had been rejected as the Party's nominee on three other occasions and in part
because he had become much more radical than the increasingly conservative Republican Party. Id. at 87-89.
Thurmond ran as the States' Rights Democratic (Dixiecrat) candidate to protest the Democratic Party's 1948
Civil Rights initiatives. Id. at 98-102. Similarly, in 1968 George C. Wallace ran as the nominee of the newly
formed American Independent Party in order to air his grievances against the Democratic Party's Civil Rights
program, express his view that the United States should fight the Vietnam War as if it wanted win, and call for
a law and order crackdown to bring order out of the riotous chaos of the 1960s. Id. at 107-2 1.
182. See supra nn. 90-105 and accompanying text.
183. See Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 58 (discussing the primaries nominating congressional and state
officials); id. at 59 (discussing the presidential primary system).
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potential leaders of third-party movements and enable the major parties "to absorb
protest movements."
184
Many states have laws requiring voters who want an assured right to vote in
primary elections to register as a member of a recognized party. 18 5 Registering as a
member of a party and then voting regularly in that party's primary election tends to
form a stable allegiance between the voter and her party. 186 Given that third parties have
great difficulty in achieving recognized party status, 187 the allegiances formed by
primary voters are inevitably with either the Republican or the Democratic Party.
188
Moreover, Democratic and Republican primaries are given much more publicity than
any primaries held by third parties, so primaries give major-party candidates great
general election advantages in terms of generating public awareness and political
support. 1
89
2. Primary Participation Rules
The power of primary elections to define issues and select the nominees who will
have the best opportunities of winning public office has given rise to important legal
controversies as to who can participate in the primary process. These controversies
involve determining the relative balance of power among states, party elites, and voters.
At minimum, the mandatory primary expanded the universe of who can directly affect
the selection of a party's nominees from party elites to persons registered to vote as a
member of that party.
190
But, what about voters who want to be able to help determine the general election
ballot without formally joining a political party? What about a party that feels the need
to use its primary elections as a means of reaching out to Independents or members of
other parties? What about voters who want to be able to vote in primaries
office-by-office for their preferred candidate irrespective of their party registration?
What about party critics who want to force parties to allow more than just their members
to participate in their primaries as a means of producing less partisan general election
candidates? Prior to Clingman, the Court answered all of these questions except the
question of whether a party should be able to invite members of other parties to
participate in its primaries. In doing so, the Court provided the precedents most relevant
to evaluating its Clingman decision. As will be demonstrated below, voters have been
the big losers in these cases.
In many respects, the tone was set in Nader v. Schaffer,19 1 a federal district court
case that was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme Court without
184. Id. at 58. "[T]he Democrats absorbed the Populists in 1896; the Democrats took back the 1948
Dixiecrats; the Republicans and Democrats sought the followers of George Wallace after 1968; and both
parties openly courted Perot voters in 1996." Id.
185. See id.
186. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 58.
187. See supra nn. 147-152 and accompanying text.
188. Bibby & Maisel, supra n. 2, at 58.
189. Hershey, supra n. 124, at 30.
190. See supra nn. 90-105 and accompanying text.
191. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976).
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opinion. 192 In Nader, independent voters sought to strike down Connecticut's closed
primary laws, which prohibited them from voting in primary elections. 193  The
independent voters asserted that Connecticut's closed primary election laws (1) deprive
them of their "right to vote... in an 'integral part'-the primary elections-'of the
process by which their United States Senators and Representatives are chosen,'
(2) deprive them of equal protection of the law "by denying them the right to vote in
primary elections while extending this right to enrolled party members," and (3) compel
them "to choose between a right to vote ... and the right freely to associate for the
advancement of political ideas ... with a particular candidate regardless of the
candidate's party affiliation." 194 The district court rejected these assertions through an
analytical framework that has provided a template for assessing political associational
rights in the context of primary elections.
First, the district court assessed the burdens Connecticut's closed primary imposed
on the associational rights asserted by the independent voters to determine what level of
scrutiny should be applied to Connecticut's closed primary laws. 195 Next, it identified
any countervailing associational rights possessed by the political parties that might be
transgressed by the remedy asked for by the independent voters. 196 Then, the district
court assessed Connecticut's asserted interests in its closed primary laws by applying the
level of scrutiny dictated by its determination of whether the closed primary severely
burdens the independent voters' voting and associational rights. 197 Finally, the district
court resolved the independent voters' equal protection claims in light of the relative
interests they and the parties have in the parties' primary elections.
198
From its analysis of the independent voters' claims, the district court concluded
that any burdens Connecticut's closed primary laws places on the independent voters'
voting rights and rights of association are minimal. 199 To that end, it held persons do not
have a right to vote in primary elections unless they comply with legitimate state rules
regulating the operation of primary elections, which include party membership
requirements. 20 It also found that apart from voting in partisan primaries the
independent voters have significant opportunities to associate with candidates of their
choice to promote political ideas without joining a political party, including working in
support of or contributing money to these candidates. 201 Most importantly, the district
court held that the party membership condition for voting in partisan primaries only
192. Naderv. Shaffer, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
193. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 840-42.
194. Id. at 840; see also id. at 842 (discussing the plaintiffs' assertions); id. at 842-44 (rejecting plaintiffs'
assertions); id. at 848 (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection argument).
195. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 842-44, 848-49.
196. Id. at 844-45.
197. Id. at 845-49.
198. Id. at 848.
199. Id. at 848-49.
200. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 842 n. 4 (inferring that party membership is a legitimate primary election
restriction from a case involving impermissible racial discrimination-Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661
(1944)-in which the challenger had not questioned the party membership requirement and was therefore
presumably willing and able to become a party member in order to satisfy standing requirements).
201. Id. at 842.
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slightly burdens a person's right to vote since it "imposes ... no affirmative party
obligations ... , in terms of time or money, [or] even [the] obliga[tion] to vote for the
party's positions or candidates .... 202 Thus, the district court assessed the validity of
Connecticut's primary laws on the basis of whether they are "reasonably related to the
accomplishment of legitimate state goals."
20 3
In determining whether Connecticut's closed primary was reasonably related to
achieving legitimate state goals, the district court took note of the fact that political
parties and their loyal adherents have constitutionally protected rights of association
stemming from their "ultimate goal ... of obtain[ing] control of the levers of
government by winning elections" so their "policies and philosophies" "may [be] put
into operation. ' 2° 4 Therefore, said the court, "the state has a legitimate interest in
protecting party members' associational rights, by legislating to protect the party 'from
intrusion by those with adverse political principles."'
20 5
The district court held that Connecticut's closed primary laws reasonably serve
several interests related to the State's "general ... interest in protecting the overall
integrity of the historic electoral process." 20 6 These interests include "preserving parties
as viable and identifiable interest groups; insuring that the results of primary
elections ... accurately reflect the voting of party members[; and] preventing fraudulent
and deceptive conduct which mars the nominating process."
20 7
In determining whether Connecticut's closed primary reasonably serves the State's
asserted interests, the district court focused on the need to provide "assurance that
primary election results reflect the will of party members, undistorted by the votes of
those unconcerned with, if not actually hostile to, the principles, philosophies, and goals
of the party.' 2° 8  This focus led the district court to proclaim that "a candidacy
determined by the votes of non-party members is arguably a fraudulent candidacy."20 9 It
also led the district court to conclude that the closed primary reasonably promotes
primary elections that reflect the will of party members and do not produce fraudulent
candidacies by "condition[ing] one's participation in a party's nominating process on
some showing of loyalty to that party.' 2 10 Given the inability of parties to test voters'
"political ideas before allowing [them] to vote in a primary election," 2 11 the court found
that the partisan registration requirement "is a constitutionally acceptable surrogate."
2 12
Somewhat offhandedly, the district court also found that the closed primary laws create a
202. Id. at 843, 843-44.
203. Id. at 849, 848-49.
204. Id. at 844, 844-45.
205. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 845.
206. Id,
207. Id.
208. Id, at 846.
209. Id. at 847, 846-47.
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public list of party members that facilitates the "direct solicitation of party members"
during the primary campaign.
2 13
With respect to the independent voters' equal protection claim, the district court
admitted that they are interested in and affected by partisan primaries.2 14 Nevertheless,
it found that the independent voters "are not 'interested' in primary elections in the
crucial, distinguishing aspect that party members are interested. 2 15 Party members
want to nominate "the candidate who presents the best chance of winning the general
election while remaining most faithful to party policies and philosophies." 2 16 Thus, the
district court concluded that a state does not engage in impermissible discrimination by
excluding independent voters from partisan primary elections because persons who
refuse to join a party "are [not] as 'interested' as party members in the outcome of the
party nominating process."
2 17
Nader involved a conflict between a state and voters over a state law designed in
part to vindicate the associational rights of parties to define who can participate in their
primaries. In contrast, the 1981 case of Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette2 18 involved the attempts of a state, its voters, and state
party leaders to mandate broader participation in the process of selecting national
convention delegates than a party's national leaders desired.
Wisconsin statutorily mandated open presidential primaries in which any voter is
entitled to participate in a specific party's presidential primary regardless whether he or
she is publicly registered as a member of that party. 2 19 The purpose of Wisconsin's
primary is to demonstrate the preferences of Wisconsin voters for particular presidential
candidates. 220 Delegates to national party conventions are selected by other processes
operated by the political parties. 22 1 However, Wisconsin's open primary law required
that any delegation selected to attend a party's national convention must vote for
presidential candidates in accordance with the results of Wisconsin's open presidential
primary.22 2 This requirement conflicted with the national Democratic Party rules that:
(1) only persons publicly affiliated with the Democratic Party can participate in the
Party's processes for selecting delegates to the Democratic Party's National
Convention; 2 23 and (2) at every stage delegates be apportioned among the various
candidates in accordance to the support they received from binding primaries or
alternative caucuses and conventions. 224 These rules were implemented in part to insure
that the support presidential candidates received at the Democratic National Convention
213. Id. at 848.
214. Id.
215. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 848 (emphasis omitted).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
219. Id. at 109-12.
220. Id. at 111-12.
221. Id. at 112.
222. Id. at H12, 112 n. 6.
223. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 109, 109 n. 1.
224. Id. at 109-10, 110n. 2.
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reflected only the preferences of persons formally affiliated with the Democratic
Party.
225
In resolving this conflict in favor of the national Democratic Party, the Court felt
bound by the precedent of its earlier decision in Cousins v. Wigoda,2 26 which dealt with
whether a state could enjoin a national party from seating a delegation that was not
selected in accordance with a state's delegate selection primary laws. 227 Without saying
so directly, the Cousins Court adopted the assertions of the enjoined delegates that the
injunction significantly interfered with constitutional rights of political association
enjoyed by them and the Democratic Party.22 8 Accordingly, it applied strict scrutiny to
Illinois' asserted interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process to determine if
it were compelling.229 After speculating that permitting states to assert electoral rights
that affect the processes by which parties select presidential nominees would be
disruptive of those processes, 230 the Cousins Court held that a state's "interest in
protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be deemed compelling in the
context of selecting delegates to the National Party Convention. "
23 1
Proceeding from the Cousins pronouncement that "the National Democratic Party
and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association,"232 the
La Follette Court proclaimed that this right "presupposes the freedom to identify the
people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people
only." 233  It then rejected Wisconsin's attempt to argue that its open primary laws
imposed only minor burdens on this right by holding that, with respect to membership
requirements, neither the State nor a court may "constitutionally substitute its own
judgment for that of the Party." 234  By doing so, the Court essentially held that any
interference, no matter how minor, with a party's interest in defining its membership
constitutes a severe infringement on the political association rights of a party and its
225. Id. at 115-20. Democratic Party leaders were concerned that various state laws permitting persons who
were not registered Democrats to play a role in selecting delegates to the Democratic National Convention
could result in the Convention selecting a presidential nominee who would not have been selected had only
registered Democrats been involved in the selection process. Id. A study of the Wisconsin primaries
from 1964-1972 revealed that this was no idle concern. In 1964, 26% of the persons voting in the Democratic
primary were not registered Democrats. Id. at 118 n. 19. Governor George Wallace received 62% of the
non-adherent vote, but only 7% of the registered Democrat vote. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 118 n. 19. In 1968,
28% of the persons participating in the Democratic primary were non-adherents, 70% of which voted for
Senator Eugene McCarthy and 14% of which voted for President Lyndon B. Johnson, while among registered
Democrats 48% voted for Senator McCarthy and 39% voted for President Johnson. Id. Finally, in 1972, 34%
of the persons participating in the presidential primary were non-adherents, 33% of which voted for Senator
George McGovern and 29% of which voted for Governor Wallace, while among registered Democrats 51%
voted for Senator McGovern and 7% voted for Governor Wallace. Id.
226. Id. at 121-22 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)).
227. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 478-83.
228. Id. at 487-88.
229. Id. at 489-91.
230. Id. at 489-90.
231. Id. at491.
232. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 121 (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).
233. Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).
234. Id. at 123-24, 124 n. 25.
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members. Accordingly, it proceeded to determine whether Wisconsin's interests in its
open primary were compelling.
235
Wisconsin argued that its open primary laws served the compelling interest of
"preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot,
increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters."
236
Rather than determine whether these interests were compelling, the Court found that they
"all... go to the conduct of the Presidential preference primary-not to the imposition
of voting requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually selected as
delegates." 2 37  As a consequence, the Court held that "the interests advanced by
[Wisconsin] do not justify its substantial intrusion into the associational freedom of
members of the National Party."
23 8
Justice Powell filed a notable dissent in La Follette.239 Of importance to this
article is his charge that the majority failed to analyze critically the magnitude of the
burden imposed by Wisconsin's open primary laws on the national Democratic Party's
presidential nominating processes. 24  From his analysis, he found that Wisconsin's open
primary laws do not impose significant burdens on the national Democratic Party's
associational rights.
24 1
First, he noted that these laws do not directly affect delegate selection as did the
Illinois laws at issue in Cousins.242 "Wisconsin merely requires that the delegates vote
in accordance with the results of the Wisconsin open primary." 24 3 Thus, a party must
respect the results of a primary in which some voters affiliated with it "secretly, in the
privacy of the voting booth[, but it] remain[ed] free to require public affiliation from
anyone wishing any greater degree of participation in party affairs.
244
Second, Justice Powell contended that the national Democratic Party's
associational interests were insignificantly burdened by a requirement that it respect the
results of a primary in which persons who were not publicly affiliated with the
245Democratic Party voted. In support of this contention, he argued that the results of
such primaries should be regarded as reflecting the legitimate preferences of persons
who have significant affiliations with the Democratic Party because a person's choice to
vote in the Democratic primary is itself a significant act of affiliation. 24 6 He also noted
235. Id. at 124-26.
236. Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted).
237. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 125 (footnote omitted).
238. Id at 125-26 (footnotes omitted).
239. Id. at 127-37 (Powell, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
240. Id. at 127-34.
241. Id. at 127, 134.
242. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 128-30.
243. Id. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. Id. at 129-30 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
245. Id. at 130-34.
246. Thus, he cited the following quote from a law review comment that in turn had cited to one of his
dissenting opinions:
"Independents and members of other parties who seek to participate in a party primary will do so
precisely because they identify with the community of interest .... Their very motive for
participating in the primary would be to associate with a party presenting 'candidates and issues
more responsive to their immediate concerns."'
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that the ways some states conduct closed primaries-"[v]oters do not register as
members of a party; at the polling place they simply state their party preference and are
given the ballot of that party, no questions asked" 24 7 -- diminish any practical differences
between open and closed primaries.24 8 Moreover, perhaps reflecting his views as to who
truly speaks for the Party, Justice Powell asserted that the outcomes of open primaries
were at least as representative of the views of rank-and-file Democrats as those produced
by delegate selection caucuses attended by a few party elites. 24 9 Most intriguingly, he
suggested that the Democratic Party's historical lack of ideological zeal, as demonstrated
by its openness to "various elements reflecting most of the American political spectrum,"
makes it hard to argue that Wisconsin's open primary facilitates the ability of persons
with incompatible beliefs to damage the Party's ideological identity.
250
Eight years after Nader, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a case, Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut,25 1 that was Nader's mirror image. Tashjian pitted the
Republican Party and independent voters against Connecticut and the Democratic Party
over whether closed primary laws are constitutional as applied to a party that wants to
allow independent voters to participate in its primaries. 2 52 At the time, there were many
more registered Democrats and Independent voters than there were registered
Republicans. 25 3  Accordingly, Republican Party leaders decided it would be smart
politics to reach out to Connecticut's independent voters.
2 54
Nader, Cousins, and La Follette were concerned with protecting parties from the
possible negative effects on their core identities and missions of being forced to associate
with persons they regard as non-members. Tashjian presented the Court with the ticklish
issue of whether states can prevent parties from taking the risks associated with inviting
outsiders into their nominating processes in order to pursue the potential advantages of
broadening their political associations. Relying heavily on the logic and holding of La
Follette, the Court held five-to-four that Connecticut's closed primary laws
impermissibly burdened the political association rights of the Republican Party and
independent voters who might want to accept the invitation to vote in Republican
primaries without first registering as a member of the Republican Party.
25 5
The Court characterized the political association right at stake in Tashjian in the
same terms used to describe the association right at stake in La Follette-"'the freedom to
Id. at 132 n. 5 (quoting Arnie R. Braafladt, Student Author, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in
Political Party Primary Elections, 14 Willamette L.J. 259, 290 (1978)).
247. LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 133 n. 8.
248. Id. at 133.
249. Id. at 133, 134n. 11.
250. Id. at 131, 131-32 (footnote omitted).
251. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
252. The Republican Party of Connecticut changed its party rules so that independent voters could vote in its
primary elections. Id. at 212. However, Republican attempts to amend Connecticut's closed primary laws so
that independents could vote in Republican primaries were thwarted first by the Democratically controlled
legislature and then by a vetoing Democratic governor after the Republican Party won control of both houses of
the legislature. Id. at 212-13.
253. As of October 1983, Connecticut had "659,268 registered Democrats, 425,695 registered Republicans,
and 532,723 registered and unaffiliated voters . I..." Id. at 212 n. 3.
254. Id. at 212-13.
255. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213-25 (Marshall, J. & Brennan, White, Blackmun & Powell, JJ., joining).
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join together in furtherance of common political beliefs [which] 'necessarily presupposes
the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association. ' ' 2 56 Further, the Court
found that the Republican Party was exercising this right of association when it reached
out to permit independent voters to participate in its primaries without publicly affiliating
with it.
257
After noting that there is a broad continuum of participation in the affairs of a
major party-organizing, fundraising, or simply voting for some of its candidates 258 _
the Court hypothesized that it would be an unconstitutional infringement on a party's
right of association if the State were to prohibit non-members to participate as financial
contributors or nominees of a party. 259 Expanding beyond these hypothetical examples,
the Court then held that the "State limit[ed] the Party's associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture" 260 by "plac[ing] limits upon the group of registered voters whom the
Party may invite to participate in the 'basic function' of selecting the Party's
candidates.
'"2 6 1
Much as it did in La Follette, the Court assessed the interests asserted by the State
in a manner that suggested it believed that any restriction on a party's efforts to define an
association between itself and some defined group constitutes a severe burden on a
party's right of association. 262 Thus, it proceeded as if a fundamental right had been
transgressed by carefully, if not strictly, scrutinizing each of the State's asserted interests
in its closed primary laws.
263
The Court rejected the State's plea that it would be too costly to provide the
election machinery required to enable independents to participate in the Republican
Party's primaries.2 64  It did so by simply holding that potential cost increases cannot
justify infringements on the Republican Party's association rights.
265
Prevention of party raiding was rejected as a justification because the Court found
that party raiding was not implicated in this case.2 66 Not only did the Court express
great skepticism that hordes of independent voters could be enlisted in the task of.
256. Id. at 214, 214-15 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122).
257. The Tashjian Court commented that "[t]he Party's attempt to broaden the base of public participation in
and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association." Id.
at 214.
258. Id. at 215.
259. Id.
260. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216.
261. Id. at 215-16.
262. Id. at217-25.
263. Id. However, before proceeding to analyze the States' interests, the Court used a footnote to dismiss the
assertions that Connecticut's closed primary laws imposed only a de minimis infringement on the Party's
associational rights. Id. at 216 n. 7. Connecticut permitted previously unaffiliated voters to register as a
member of a Party "as late as noon on the last business day preceding the primary." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216
n. 7. (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-56 (1985)). Thus, the State argued that any independent voter who wanted to
participate in the Republican Party's primaries could easily meet the Party membership requirement. Id.
at 215-16. The Court rejected this argument by noting that the formal affiliation process does not provide the
Party with the unilateral means of broadening the opportunities of registered voters to join the association and it
"conditions the exercise of the associational right upon the making of a public statement of adherence to the
Party which the State requires regardless of the actual beliefs of the individual voter." Id. at 216 n. 7.
264. Id at 217-18.
265. Id. at 218.
266. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 219.
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nominating the worst possible Republican candidates, it also noted that if this were
possible the independent hordes could carry out the raid by simply registering as
Republicans at the eleventh hour-the last business day before the primary.
267
Although the Court found that the issue of party raiding was not applicable to this
case, it took note of a study introduced by the Democratic Party in La Follette, which
found that "'the existence of "raiding" has never been conclusively proven by survey
research."' 2 68 It then suggested that in a case where party raiding could be relevant, the
Court possibly should consider "whether the continuing difficulty of proving that raiding
is possible attenuates the asserted state interest in preventing the practice.
' 269
Connecticut argued that its closed primary laws prevent voter confusion inherent in
the difficulty of determining the views of candidates who are "nominated... by an
unknown amorphous body outside the party." 270 The Court rejected this argument after
acknowledging that party labels may be used by voters as "a shorthand designation of the
views of party candidates" in part because it had confidence that voters were capable of
"inform[ing] themselves about campaign issues" so they will not be "'misled' by party
labels." 27 1 More importantly, the Court found that an amorphous group would be
incapable of nominating the Party's candidates because under Connecticut's primary
laws no one can be a candidate in a party primary without first receiving the support of at
least 20% of the delegates attending a nominating convention in which non-members
cannot participate. 272  It also observed that Republican candidates must attract a
significant number of independent voters to win the general election, and that
Connecticut's closed primary laws would prohibit the Republican Party from using the
best way of determining which candidate could best appeal to independents; allowing
independents to vote in Republican primaries.
273
Finally, the Court rejected Connecticut's contention that its closed primary laws
further its "compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the two-party system and the
responsibility of party govemment. ' 274 After noting that debates over the relative merits
of closed and open primaries had yet to produce a consensus as to which was better,
275
and that the political systems of the twenty-nine states which do not have closed
primaries have not gone to rack and ruin,276 the Court proclaimed that it was not its role
to determine whether Connecticut's or the Republican Party's choice of primaries was
the best. 277 The Court also declined the State's offer to help save the Republican Party
from "undertaking a course of conduct destructive of its own interests" 278 by citing La
267. Id.
268. Id. at 219 n. 9 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123 n. 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 220.
271. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220.
272. Id. at220-21.
273. Id. at 221.
274. Id. at 222, 222-24.
275. Id. at 222-23.
276. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 222 n. 11,223 n. 12.
277. Id. at 223.
278. Id. at 224.
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Follette for the proposition that neither a state nor a court "may... constitutionally
substitute its own judgment for that of the Party." 279 Presaging Clingman, the Court
followed this conclusion with a warning that the outcome of Tashjian does not
automatically resolve the issue of whether a state can prohibit one party from inviting
members of other parties to participate in its primaries since such an invitation "would
threaten other parties with.., disorganization effects .... 280
Also presaging Clingman was Justice Scalia's scathing dissent.2 81  He first
questioned whether there was a cognizable associational interest at stake, for to him "[i]t
seems... fanciful to refer to [the desire of the Republican Party to let non-members vote
in its primaries] as an interest in freedom of association between ... the Republican
Party and the putative independent voters."2 82  Next, he found that the Republican
Party's desire to select nominees who could attract the largest combined Republican and
independent vote could be satisfied by the Party paying for polls of independent voters
rather that requiring the State to let its primary be used for this task.
283
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the Court's characterization of the State's goal as an
attempt to save the Party from itself.284 Reflecting a belief that the Party's rank-and-file
have the best right to speak for the Party, he noted that the decision to invite
independents to vote in Republican primaries was made at a Republican Convention
rather than by a vote in which all party members could participate. 2 85 Thus, he
questioned whether this decision truly reflected the majority will of the Party's
members. 286 More significantly, Justice Scalia contended that the parties are not now
free to resume nominating their candidates by convention rather than through primary
elections because the mandatory primary was a reform intended to save parties from
themselves by making them more democratic. 287 So, he expressed exasperation that
"the Republican Party's delegation of its democratic choice to a Republican Convention
can be proscribed, but its delegation of that choice to nonmembers of the Party
cannot."
288
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,2 89 the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously struck down California laws prohibiting "the official
governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries."
2 90
The Court found that the endorsements constituted core political speech that could not be
279. Id. (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24).
280. Id. at224n. 13.
281. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 234-37 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 235. "The Connecticut voter who, while steadfastly refusing to register as a Republican, casts a
vote in the Republican primary, forms no more meaningful an 'association' with the Party than does the
independent or registered Democrat who responds to questions by a Republican Party pollster." Id.
283. Id. at 236.
284. Id.
285. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 236.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 237.
288. Id.
289. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
290. Id. at 216. The Court also struck down California laws that dictated virtually all aspects of party
governing structures, but this portion of Eu is not relevant to the topic of this article.
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restricted absent a showing that it served compelling state interests. 29 1  Party
endorsements constitute core political speech, said the Court, because they provide
voters with information about "whether a candidate adheres to the tenets of the party or
whether party officials believe that the candidate is qualified for the position sought."
29 2
It also proclaimed that state limits on speech are "particularly egregious where the State
censors the political speech a political party shares with its members." 2 93 Moreover, the
Court found that the endorsement ban "suffocates" the parties' rights of political
association by preventing them "from promoting candidates 'at the crucial juncture at
which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action, and
hence to political power in the community.'
294
California justified the endorsement ban as necessary to promote its compelling
interests in having a "stable government and protecting voters from confusion and undue
influence." 295 However, the Court found that California failed to provide evidence that
the endorsement ban in any way promoted government stability. 296  In response to
California's assertion that the ban promoted government stability by keeping parties
from splintering into factionalism through self-defeating intraparty strife, the Court held
that it had never authorized state regulation "to mitigate intraparty factionalism during a
primary campaign," 297 especially since primaries provide "an ideal forum in which to
resolve [intraparty feuds]." 298 Citing La Follette, the Court held that states may not
substitute their judgments for that of political parties "even if a ban on endorsements
saves a political party from pursuing self-destructive acts."
299
In 1996, the California electorate overwhelming approved an initiative petition
proposing to replace California's closed primary system with a blanket primary
system.30 0  Blanket primary elections feature ballots on which office-by-office every
candidate is listed regardless of party affiliation and permit every voter, regardless of
party affiliation, to vote office-by-office for the candidate of his preference. 30 1 For each
office, the blanket primary determines a party's nominee on the basis of which person
received the highest vote among all candidates from that party who sought that office.
302
291. Id. at222-24.
292. Id. at 223. The Court noted that the silencing of official party organizations had enabled "candidate[s]
with views antithetical to those of [their] part[ies] nevertheless to win... primary [elections]." Id. at 217
(footnote omitted). In fact, a former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan had managed to win a Democratic
Congressional primary even though his political views were "antithetical to those of the Democratic Party."
Eu, 489 U.S. at 217 n. 4.
293. Id. at 224.
294. Id. (quoting Tashjian, 489 U.S. at 216).
295. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
296. Id.
297. Eu, 489 U.S. at 227.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 227-28.
300. CaL Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 169 F.3d 646 (9th
Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
301. Id. at 1291-92.
302. Id. at 1290.
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Blanket primaries obviously allow persons unaffiliated with a party to help
determine that party's nominees. 303  To prevent this from happening, the governing
bodies of four parties-Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, and Peace & Freedom-went
to court seeking to have the blanket primary declared unconstitutional.3 °4 They did so
even though it appeared that the majority of their rank-and-file members who voted in
the initiative election supported the blanket primary.305 After losing in federal district
court,306 and in the federal appeals court, 307 the protesting political parties prevailed at
the U.S. Supreme Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones.
30 8
At the outset, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the blanket primary proponents'
argument, accepted by the dissenting Justices, that the right of political association is
inapplicable to primary elections because they are purely public affairs that play an
integral role in citizens selecting their public officials. 309 Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia acknowledged that states have broad regulatory powers with respect to
"structuring and monitoring the election process." 3 10 He further noted that this power
can be used by the states to require parties to select nominees through primary elections,
"require parties to demonstrate 'a significant modicum of support' before allowing their
candidates a place on th[e] ballot," and "require party registration a reasonable period of
time before a primary election" "to prevent 'party raiding."' 3 11  Nevertheless, he
proclaimed that although primary elections are public affairs subject to certain state
regulations,312 they are also party affairs because they determine each party's nominees
for public office. 313 As such, primary elections may not be regulated in a manner that
violates a party's First Amendment right of political association.
3 14
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1292.
305. Reliable exit polls revealed that the blanket primary
was supported by 61 percent of Democrats, 57 percent of Republicans, and 69 percent of
Independents.... Although the turnout by California's six minor parties was too small to sample,
given the broad public support for [the blanket primary] among all groups of every sort, it is likely
that a majority of the members of these parties also favored the initiative.
Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1291. Based on these data, proponents of the blanket primary argued that the
rank-and-file members of each challenging party approved the initiative and therefore the parties consented to
it. Id. at 1294 n. 16. The court rejected this argument on three grounds: (1) The polls do not definitively show
that a majority of minor parties' rank-and-file members supported the blanket primary, (2) polls should not be
accepted for voting when trying to determine the wishes of an electoral subset, and (3) accepting the results of
a voters' poll as a party's decision transgresses the procedural rules each party has established to specify who
makes decisions for the party and how those decisions are to be made. Id.
306. Id. at 1289.
307. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
308. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
309. Id. at 572-73, 573 n. 4. In his dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens insisted that "[tihe
so-called 'right not to associate' ... is simply inapplicable to participation in a state election." Id. at 595. He
supported this assertion by opining that "an election ... is a public affair[, and therefore] while state rules
abridging participation in its elections should be closely scrutinized, the First Amendment does not inhibit the
State from acting to broaden voter access to state-run, state-financed elections." Id. (footnote omitted).
310. ldat572.
311. Jones, 530 U.S. at 572.
312. Id. at 572-73.
313. Id. at 573 n. 4.
314. Id. at 573.
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Contrary to the views of the dissent, the Court held that the right of association
applicable to primary elections includes the right of parties to insist that non-members
not be allowed to participate. 315 Justice Stevens contended that states should be allowed
to broaden voters' access to primary elections even if political parties object, but that
"state rules abridging participation in its elections should be closely scrutinized .... 316
In response, Justice Scalia noted the Court's long traditions in honoring the right of
political organizations to "'limit control over their decisions to those who share the
interests and persuasions that underlie the association's being."' 3 17 More importantly,
he reaffirmed the Court's previous recognition that the right of a political party to
exclude persons who do not share its policies and principles is most important when a
process for selecting the party's nominees for public office is involved.318  Finally,
Justice Scalia dismissed the dissents' no exclusion theory as nonsensical because it
stands for the proposition that the "First Amendment guarantee[s] a party's right to lose
its identity, but not to preserve it."
3 19
Having held that parties have a freedom of association right to exclude persons
who do not share their policies and principles from their candidate nominating processes,
the Court had little trouble finding that the blanket primary imposes a severe burden on
parties' political association rights. It noted that the blanket primary permits persons
affiliated with rival parties to vote in a party's primaries. 32  Moreover, the Court
observed that blanket primaries do not, as do closed and open primaries, confine voters
to participating in just one party's primary. 32 1 Therefore, said the Court, the blanket
primary does not require voters to engage in some arguably significant act of affiliation
with or commitment to a party before voting in that party's primary. 322 Finally, the
Court proclaimed its belief that the evidence demonstrated that under California's
blanket primary system there is a clear and present danger that a party will have a
nominee determined by adherents of an opposing party. 323 This danger was magnified
for minor parties because in the first blanket primary "the total votes cast [in the
Libertarian and Peace & Freedom primaries] for party candidates in some races was
more than double the total number of registered party members."
324
315. Compare Jones, 530 U.S. at 574-76, 576 n. 7 with id. at 593-96 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
316. Id. at 595, 595-96 (footnote omitted).
317. Id. at 574 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122 n. 22).
318. Id. at 574-76 (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. 351; Eu, 489 U.S. 214; Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208; La Follette,
450 U.S. 107).
319. Id. at 576 n. 7.
320. Jones, 530 U.S. at 577-79.
321. Id. at 577, 577 n. 8.
322. Id. at 577. With respect to the affiliation required by an open primary, the Court cited to Justice
Powell's dissent in La Follette in which he theorized that in open primaries the "act of voting in [a party's]
primary fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with [that party]." Id. at 577 n. 8.
323. The Court stated: "[O]ne 1997 survey of California voters [showed that] 37 percent of Republicans said
that they planned to vote in the [next] Democratic gubernatorial primary, and 20 percent of Democrats said
they planned to vote in the [next] Republican United States Senate primary." Id. at 578. Studies from other
states produced similar data. Jones, 530 U.S. at 578. There was also credible evidence demonstrating that
cross-over voters have policy views that are distinctly different from those of voting party members. Id.
at 578-79.
324. Id. at 578 (emphasis in original).
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Proponents of the blanket primary asserted that it will not impose severe burdens
on parties' associational rights because it will rarely, if ever, produce nominees different
from those favored by a majority of the party faithful, and it still permits parties and their
members to engage in many other political activities that support their favored
candidates and policies. 325  In response, the Court observed that a party could be
significantly damaged if even one of its nominees were determined by the votes of
persons who do not support the party's policies and principles.326 It also expressed
concern that "[e]ven when the person favored by a majority of the party members
prevails, he will have prevailed by taking somewhat different positions .... "
3 2 7
"[T]he whole purpose of [the blanket primary] was to favor nominees with
'moderate' positions." 328 This caused the Court to conclude that, by forcing political
parties to associate during their primaries with non-members, the blanket primary "has
the likely outcome-indeed.., the intended outcome-of changing the parties'
message. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational
freedom. '329 As a consequence, the Court subjected the State's alleged interests in the
blanket primary to strict scrutiny.
330
Three of the State's proffered interests-"producing elected officials who better
represent the electorate[,] ... expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan
concems," 33 1 and ensuring that all voters in a district dominated by a single party get to
participate in the election that effectively selects the officeholder-were declared by the
Court to be illegitimate. 332 The first two proffered interests are illegitimate, said the
Court, because they "reduce to nothing more than a stark repudiation of freedom of
political association. .. ."333 The Court found the third proffered interest to be
illegitimate because it requires the State to violate a party's associational rights simply
because a non-member desires to participate in that party's nominating processes. 334 As
to voters stuck in districts dominated by a party to which they do not belong, the Court
advised them that they could end their plight by simply joining the dominant party.
335
The Court found that the State's four remaining interests-"promoting fairness [to
voters in safe districts], affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation,
and protecting privacy-are not... compelling." 336  It may be unfair to exclude
non-members of a dominant party in a safe district from the dominant party's primaries,
said the Court, but it is "less unfair than permitting nonparty members to hijack the
party., 3 37  The Court held that the interests of affording voters more choice and
325. Id. at 579-81.
326. Id. at 579.
327. Jones, 530 U.S. at 579-80.
328. Id. at 580 (emphasis omitted).
329. Id. at 581-82 (emphasis in original).
330. Id. at 582-86.
331. Id. at 582.
332. Jones, 530 U.S. at 582-83.
333. Id. at 582.
334. Id. at 583-84.
335. Id. at 584.
336. Id. at 584, 584-85.
337. Jones, 530 U.S. at 584.
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increasing voter participation are not compelling because they effectively
"reduce ... choice, by assuring a range of candidates who are all more 'centrist,' ' 33 8 and
require parties to provide more "choices favored by the majority."339 Finally, the Court
held that keeping voters' political affiliations secret is not compelling since this
information is not as deeply personal as medical or financial records and under federal
law must be disclosed "as a condition of appointment to certain offices."
3 4 0
C. Flawed Logic
As demonstrated above, Clingman arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court against a
background of important political realities and significant legal precedents. One would
have expected this background to have greatly informed the Clingman decision. But, as
will be shown below, the Clingman majority opinion either ignored or contradicted
elements of this background in ways that make Clingman an aberration to the Court's
political association jurisprudence.
The key political reality is that third parties have experienced almost total electoral
futility. 34 I This futility is in part caused by the singularity of the executive branch and
the election of the President through the Electoral College, two constitutional institutions
that are not likely to be changed. 34 2 In no small measure, the electoral futility of United
States third parties also has been caused by legislation, often approved by the judiciary,
that is uniquely harmful to third-party prospects-the creation of single-member
legislative districts, 343 political gerrymandering, 344 burdensome ballot access laws
coupled with voter registration cancellation provisions,34 5 bans on fusion candidacies,34 6
candidate disaffiliation requirements,
34 7 and the advent of primary elections.
348
In its prior political association cases, the Court established a number of important
principles. The most important of these is the Court's insistence that the political
association rights of political parties include an almost unfettered right to define the
scope of their political associations with voters when candidate nomination processes are
involved. 349 To drive home the importance of this right, prior to Clingman the Court
refused to give credence to any arguments that the State has the right to substitute its
judgment for that of the parties with respect to defining the scope of their associations
338. Id. (emphasis omitted).
339. Id. at 584, 584-85 (emphasis in original).
340. Id. at 585.
341. See supra nn. 2-7 and accompanying text.
342. See supra nn. 141-146 and accompanying text.
343. See supra nn. 117-129 and accompanying text.
344. See supra nn. 130-140 and accompanying text.
345. See supra nn. 147-152 and accompanying text.
346. See supra nn. 153-175 and accompanying text.
347. See supra nn. 176-181 and accompanying text.
348. See supra nn. 182-189 and accompanying text.
349. In this regard, the Court has recognized the rights of political parties to associate only with persons who
have formally affiliated with them for purposes of nominating candidates, Jones, 530 U.S. at 573-80, 576 n. 7;
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 121-26; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487-91, and the right of parties to expand their
associations to include unaffiliated voters during the candidate nomination process, Tashjian, 479 U.S.
at 214-16, 216 n. 7.
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even when the State is trying to keep parties from making choices harmful to their
electoral prospects. 35  With respect to cases involving candidate nominating processes,
the Court expressed skepticism about whether party raiding is something that can ever be
done successfully, 351 and intimated that a voter's choice to participate in a single party's
primary election is an act of significant affiliation even if she declines to register as a
member of that party.352 In combination, these principles operated so that prior to
Clingman political parties were victorious in every previous case involving the issue of
which classes of voters could participate in candidate nominating processes.
353
Perhaps the most grievous flaw of logic in the Clingman Court's opinion is its
holding that a political association between the LPO and members of other parties who
might participate in LPO primaries without dropping their current partisan affiliations
would be so weak that the constitutionality of state inference with it need not be judged
by strict scrutiny.354 This holding treats the most important act of association an
individual can have with a party and its candidates-voting-as the least important of all
the individual/party relationships in the political association continuum. It also greatly
deviates from the Court's prior holdings about how the ability of parties to control who
participates in their candidate nominating processes is essential to their electoral
prospects and the shaping of their messages to the electorate.
The Clingman Court's obsession with a person's registration status as an indicator
of the strength of her association with a particular party fails to accord proper respect and
dignity to the act of choosing to vote in a particular party's primary elections. Every
type of primary, except non-partisan and blanket primaries, requires voters to choose to
participate in the primary elections of only one party.355 By making this choice, a voter
is precluded from participating in any aspect of another party's primary elections no
matter how interested he may be in a particular candidate from that party. Picking one
party's primary is an act of significant affiliation by the voter. Justice Powell recognized
the significance of this affiliation in his La Follette dissent, 356 and the Jones Court
350. Eu, 489 U.S. at 227-28; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24, 123 n. 25. Contra
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 236-37 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
351. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at219, 219 n. 9.
352. Jones, 530 U.S at 577, 577 n. 8; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 132, 132 n. 5 (Powell, Blackmun & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting).
353. In Jones, the Court upheld the assertion of four political parties-the California Democratic,
Republican, Libertarian, and Peace & Freedom Parties-that California's blanket primary unconstitutionally
infringed their rights of political association. Tashjian, held that Connecticut's closed primary violated the
Connecticut Republican Party's political association right to have independent voters participate in its primary
elections. In La Follette, the Court held that Wisconsin delegates to the Democratic National Convention did
not have to vote in accordance with the results of Wisconsin's open presidential primary because it would
violate the associational rights of the national Democratic Party to have its presidential nomination process
affected by the votes of persons not formally affiliated with the Democratic Party. Cousins, held that it would
violate the associational rights of the national Democratic Party if it were forced to refrain from seating a
delegation from Illinois that was selected under Democratic Party delegate selection rules that violated Illinois'
election laws. In Nader, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily upheld a federal district court decision that
vindicated Connecticut's closed primary laws as applied to unaffiliated voters who wanted to participate in
partisan primaries over the objections of the State, the Connecticut Democratic Party, and the Connecticut
Republican Party.
354. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2037-38.
355. Kanthak & Williams, supra n. 102, at 8-10.
356. LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 132, 132 n. 5.
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insinuated that the significance of this affiliation could insulate open primaries from
constitutional attack by a party unhappy about members of other parties voting in its
primaries.
35 7
Moreover, of all the ways a voter may associate with a party-donate money,
participate in party organization, volunteer to work for a party's candidates, register as a
member of the party, vote in the party's primaries, and vote for the party's general
election candidates-the act of voting is the most important because it combines with the
votes of others to determine party nominees and the winners of public office. 3 5 8 In an
age where the turnout of registered voters for primary elections is often well below
50%, 359 it is difficult to understand why the Court privileges registration over the
willingness to vote, especially when a party does not object to members of other parties
voting in its primaries. 360
Given that the act of choosing to participate in the primary of only one party is an
act of significant affiliation, it should not matter how hard or easy it might be for a
member of one party to reregister as a member of another party or as an independent in
order to be eligible to vote in another party's primary. Nevertheless, as noted previously,
the Clingman Court directly held that it is less burdensome for a person to disaffiliate
publicly from his current party of choice by reregistering as an independent than it is for
a previously independent voter to publicly affiliate with a party.36 1 The Clingman Court
offered no justification for this holding other than to cite a footnote in Tashjian,
362
wherein the Tashjian Court asserted that it would severely burden an independent voter
to condition her "exercise of the associational right upon the making of a public
statement of adherence to the Party which the State requires regardless of the actual
beliefs of the individual voter." 363 Thus, the Tashjian principle behind the Clingman
holding seems to be that a person should not have to take public action that appears to
signify his agreement with political views with which he really does not agree as the
price of exercising his political association rights.
Logically, the Tashjian principle enunciated above applies well to a person who
genuinely identifies with the traditional policies and principles of the party to which she
belongs but who also wants to vote for a candidate in another party's primary. A person
who must disaffiliate from her current party to vote in another party's primary is forced
to take public action that falsely signals her repudiation of her current party's policies
and principles. Conceptually, this person's intellectual burden is equal to that of the
independent voter who must affiliate publicly with a party to vote in a primary election.
All this begs the question of why a person registered as a member of one party
would not want to change her registration but still wants to vote in another party's
357. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 577,577 n. 8.
358. For example, money is very important to the outcome of elections, but votes count more; this fact is
well illustrated by seven of the top fifteen money raisers losing in the 1996 U.S. Senate elections. Kobrak,
supra n. 95, at 125.
359. See supra n. 101 and accompanying text.
360. See Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2048-49 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
361. Id. at 2038 (majority).
362. Id. (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n. 7).
363. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n. 7.
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primary. Justice Powell's dissent in La Follette supplies the answer. There, he quoted a
law review article for the proposition that:
"[M]embers of other parties who seek to participate in a party primary will do so precisely
because they identify with the community of interest, if indeed one exists. Their very
motive for participating in the primary would be to associate with a party presenting
'candidates and issues more responsive to their immediate concerns."' 364
If left free to cast a vote in another party's primary without having to reregister,
such voters send signals to their parties as to what issues positions and types of
candidates they wish their parties would provide. This phenomenon perhaps explains
why non-party members voted in higher percentages than party members for George
Wallace in the 1964 Wisconsin open Democratic presidential primary election.
365
Undoubtedly, within this group of voters were Republicans producing a vote that sent a
signal to the Republican Party that a sizable number of Republicans perhaps wanted less
vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws. So, members of a party have sound reasons
why they might want to accept the invitation of another party to vote in its primaries
without first disaffiliating from their current party of choice.
The Jones Court found that blanket primaries impose severe burdens on the
associational rights of a political party by mandating that independent voters and persons
affiliated with other parties participate in its primary elections. 366 These severe burdens
include a heightened risk that a party will be saddled with both nominees who are not
favored by its voting members and altered campaign messages. 367 For example, in
Jones the parties were concerned that blanket primaries would produce moderate
nominees who would be less inclined to advocate vigorously for the parties' principles
and policies. 368  So, the Jones Court used strict scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of California's blanket primary.
369
But, what if a party desires to nominate less ideological candidates in order to send
more moderate messages to the electorate? It probably will be unable to accomplish
these goals unless it is allowed to expand its primary election associations. 370 Therefore,
a law that would prevent such a party from including members of other parties and
independent voters in its primary election is no less burdensome on associational rights
than a law that prevents a party which desires to be more ideologically pure from
confining its primary election associations to its own registered members. Essentially,
that is what the Tashjian Court held and why it used strict scrutiny to judge the
constitutionality of Connecticut's closed primary laws. 37 1  That is also why strict
scrutiny should have been used in Clingman.
364. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 132 n. 5 (quoting Braafladt, supra n. 246, at 290).
365. Id. at 118-19 n. 19.
366. Jones, 530 U.S. at 574-82.
367. Id. at 579-82.
368. Id. at 580.
369. Id. at 581-82.
370. This is because a party's primary electorate tends to be more ideologically pure than the general
election electorate. See supra n. 102 and accompanying text.
371. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217-25.
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Even in the absence of applying strict scrutiny, none of the interests advanced by
Oklahoma should have been accepted as legitimate reasons for preventing the LPO from
inviting voters from other parties to participate in its primary elections and for requiring
voters from other parties to disaffiliate from their current party of choice before
accepting the LPO's invitation. Previous cases established that a state has no authority to
protect a party from its own folly, especially with respect to decisions and actions
affecting their selection of nominees.372 So preventing non-party members, hostile to
LPO policies and principles, from swamping LPO primaries in ways that produce
nominees who are not supported by true LPO members, and who will campaign on
themes antithetical to LPO ideology, is not a legitimate state interest.
Nor is it legitimate for a state to have any concern that an open LPO primary could
confuse voters, who rely on party labels as a guide to a candidate's ideology, by causing
the selection of LPO nominees whose issues positions contradict traditional LPO
ideology. As previously noted, the LPO may have wanted to have open primaries as a
means of widening its support through the selection of less ideological candidates.
Denying the LPO this opportunity on the basis that general election voters may be misled
by a change in the ideology of LPO candidates would effectively impose a permanent
message and ideology on the LPO in violation of its First Amendment rights.
373
It is specious for Oklahoma to express concern that open LPO primaries could
reduce the commitments of registered partisan voters to their parties of current choice
and thereby undermine state voter registration lists as reliable databases of voters who
will help parties and candidates during elections. In an era where the turnout of
registered voters in primary elections is quite low,374 and strength of party commitments
is declining precipitously, as reflected in the strength of party identification surveys and
increased ticket splitting, 375 voter registration lists are already notoriously inaccurate
guides as to who are loyal party members.
Moreover, in September 2005, a report of the Commission on Federal Election
Reform revealed that voter registration lists are of very low quality in many states
because they contain a large percentage of inactive voters as well as the names of
persons who have died or moved away. 376 Therefore, state voter registration lists are of
dubious value for purposes of enhancing electioneering and party-building efforts, which
is why the two major parties have developed their own databases for these purposes.
377
As a consequence, the effects of an open LPO primary on the usefulness of voter
registration lists in identifying loyal party members are unlikely to be significant as
372. Eu, 489 U.S. at 227-28; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24, 123 n. 25. Contra
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
373. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 579-82.
374. See supra nn. 10, 101 and accompanying text.
375. See supra nn. 8-11 and accompanying text.
376. Center for Democracy and Election Management, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report of the
Commission on Federal Election Reform pts. 2-6, http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf
(Sept. 2005).
377. See Noah J. Goodhart, The New Party Machine: Information Technology in State Political Parties, in
The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties 120 (John C. Green & Daniel
M. Shea eds., 3d ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999).
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compared to the effects of other factors that have greatly undermined the usefulness of
state voter registration lists for electoral purposes.
Finally, Oklahoma's concern that open LPO primaries would lead to party raiding
and "sore-loser" candidacies simply is not valid. In this regard, it is important to note
that there have been grave doubts among political scientists as to whether party raiding
has ever occurred or indeed is even possible.
37 8
If a major-party renegade and his supporters want to mount an insurgency
campaign against their party that extends into the general election, it is quite unlikely that
they will go to the trouble of trying to win an LPO nomination. The LPO has had great
difficulty remaining eligible to have its supporters designated as party members on the
state's voter registration lists and to hold primary elections. 379  The LPO nomination
would also bring with it ideological baggage, 38 and the expectation that LPO candidates
are sure losers. 38 1 All of this can be avoided under Oklahoma election law by merely
filing as an independent candidate, because in Oklahoma independent candidates go
straight to the general election upon filing the appropriate papers and fees. 382 In fact,
some political observers believe that the Republican candidate lost Oklahoma's 2002
gubernatorial race largely because a spirited independent campaign of a well-known
Republican maverick negatively focused on him.
383
378. In Tashjian, the Court noted that a study sponsored by "the national Democratic Party concluded that
'the existence of "raiding" has never been conclusively proven by survey research."' 479 U.S. at 219 n. 9
(internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). Given how the Court resolved the raiding issue, it
expressed "no opinion as to whether the continuing difficulty of proving that raiding is possible attenuates the
asserted state interest in preventing the practice." Id. (emphasis added). In Jones, the federal district court
found that even in the context of blanket primaries, which possibly could stimulate much more cross-over
voting than open primaries, there was little evidence that party raiding actually occurred. Jones, 984 F. Supp.
at 1297-98, 1298 n. 23.
379. See Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2046 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
380. For example, the Oklahoma Libertarian Party currently lists on its webpage the following legislative
priorities:
Privatize Marriage: Government licensing of marriage has caused increasing interference with the
institution by politicians and bureaucrats. By use of inducements and penalties in the tax code,
regulations of employment benefits, and other means, the relationships and decisions of individuals
are micromanaged by elected officials. The Oklahoma Libertarian Party opposes such social
planning, including additional regulation or definition of marriage, and calls for complete removal
of government from the marriage business.
Educational Tax Credit: Libertarians would enact a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for any individual (or
company) who pays for a child's education.
Second Amendment: Recognizing the second amendment of the Constitution as not merely a
firearms law, but in fact an expression of the basic human right to self-defense, we oppose all laws
that infringe upon this right and support a Vermont style concealed carry law.
Oklahoma Libertarian Party, OKLP Legislative Agenda, http://www.oklp.org/issues.html (accessed Oct. 7,
2005) (emphasis in original).
381. No minor-party's candidate for governor or President has achieved at least 10% of the vote necessary in
Oklahoma to enable it to retain recognized party status. See Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2046 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
382. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, §§ 1-102, 5-105(B).
383. John Greiner, Independent Candidate Affected Vote, Observers Say Cockfighting Proposal Also Linked
To Outcome, Daily Oklahoman (Nov. 7, 2002).
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In summation, the Court's decision in Clingman is an aberration that fails to honor
the logic of key political association precedents and reflects indifference to many current
political realities. It uses weak or imagined state interests as justifications for denying
the LPO the right to conduct open primaries that would have provided expanded
electoral options to every Oklahoma voter. As a consequence, the Court's decision in
Clingman turned a win-win opportunity into a lose-lose situation where neither the LPO
nor the voters gained a thing. Worse yet, the Court rendered this decision on the pretext
that it was necessary to save the LPO from itself, keep lazy voters from being misled by
an evolving LPO ideology, and insulating the entrenched major parties from the slightest
competitive threat.
IV. THE COURT'S THIRD-PARTY MUGGING
The Court's zeal in Clingman to insulate the major parties from competition
appears to reflect the antipathy toward third-party competition it openly displayed in
Timmons. There, the Court virtually declared an open season on third parties and
appeared to authorize the State to use any weapon short of outright banning. 384 It also
deployed a potent weapon on its own, the willingness to accept with little or no scrutiny
fantastical state interests. 385  It seems obvious that this weapon was deployed in
Clingman, for as documented above the Clingman Court accepted Oklahoma's
justifications for prohibiting an LPO open primary without any critical analysis of their
merits.
Most ominously for the future of third parties in the United States, the Timmons
Court used this "soft scrutiny" weapon to support a state interest it interjected into the
case on its own accord386-that the states have an interest in maintaining healthy
two-party systems, because two-party systems are needed to provide political stability
and to prevent party splintering and factionalism. 387 The Court explicitly asserted-as if
it were true beyond questioning-that the two-party system is perhaps the most effective
means of promoting political stability and preventing party splintering and
factionalism. 388 Implicit in this assertion is an underlying belief that the emergence of a
viable multiparty system would undermine these interests. 389 The Clingman Court's
384. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367.
385. Thus in Timmons, the Court accepted at face value Minnesota's fantasy hypothetical that if fusion were
allowed major parties would create sham minor parties with campaign-slogan-like names and thereby turn the
ballot into an advertising billboard. Id. at 365. It did so after holding that "the State's asserted regulatory
interests need only be 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation' imposed on the Party's rights. Nor do we
require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted justifications." Id. at 364
(citations omitted).
386. See id. at 377-78 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); Amy, supra n. 13, at 157. For the Court's
refutation of this assertion, see Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366 n. 10.
387. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366-67.
388. Id. at 368.
389. Although the Timmons majority did not directly imply that multiparty systems are destabilizing, its
unquestioning acceptance of the two-party system's merits demonstrates a belief that the two-party system is
superior to a multiparty system in promoting stability. Ironically, in his dissenting opinion, in which he
strongly defends the right of third parties to use fusion candidacies, Justice Stevens explicitly denigrates the
multiparty system. Id. at 370-84. For example, he observes that "Systems of proportional
representation ... may tend toward factionalism and fragile coalitions that diminish legislative effectiveness."
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uncritical acceptance of Oklahoma's assertion that an LPO open primary could cause
political instability, party splintering and excessive factualism,390 and its efforts to
undermine Tashjian,391 provide evidence that the Timmons Court's two-party mystique,
with its underlying fear of multiparty systems, was the 900 pound gorilla in the
Clingman Court's chambers.
If real world politics had demonstrated conclusively that two-party political
systems were inherently more stabilizing than multiparty systems, the Court's use of a
two-party mystique in analyzing the political association rights of third parties might be
defensible. However, "[f]acts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our
inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and
evidence. '39 2  Professor Douglas J. Amy has documented the many salient facts that
demonstrate the falsity of the two-party mystique in his essay Entrenching the Two-Party
System: The Supreme Court's Fusion Decision.393 Given the potential for the Court to
uphold state laws that unreasonably stifle political competition, it is important to
examine these facts.
Professor Amy acknowledges that in a multiparty system, the Republican and
Democratic Parties could experience parts of their broad political coalitions splitting off
to form their own parties. 394 But, he demonstrates that this party splintering need not
result in there being so many parties represented in our legislature that stable governing
coalitions cannot be formed.395  Many countries have successfully prevented the
coalition building problem by imposing electoral thresholds that must be met for a party
to win a legislative seat.3 96 Moreover, in most multiparty system countries the coalitions
created by the legislative parties have not been too fragile to provide stable governing.
397
In this regard, the tendency of our two-party system to produce weak governing
coalitions has been documented elsewhere in this article.
39 8
Professor Amy characterizes factionalism as a tendency to exacerbate group
conflict within a society. 399 Admirers of the two-party system contend that it defuses
group conflict because "[t]he two major parties... 'serve as vital, umbrella-like,
consensus-forming institutions that help counteract the powerful centrifugal forces in a
country teeming with hundreds of racial, economic, social, religious, and political
Id. at 380. He also suggests that if a third party successfully elects a fair number of state legislators,
"legislative coalition building will be made more difficult...." Id.
390. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2039-41; see supra pages 335-338.
391. Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2038; see supra pages 299-300.
392. John Adams, Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials, 'December 1770, in
Michael Moncur, The Quotations Page: Quotations by Author-John Adams, http://www.quotationspage.com/
quotes/JohnAdams/ (accessed October 8, 2005).
393. Amy, supra n. 13.
394. Id. at 160.
395. Id. at 160-61.
396. Id. at 161.
397. Professor Amy cites Norway, Germany, Austria, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Denmark, and Finland as countries with multiparty systems which have enjoyed long-running stable
governments. Id. at 162. He also cites a study of governmental stability from 1945-1992 that revealed the top
five countries in governmental stability over that period of time have multiparty systems. Amy, supra n. 13,
at 162.
398. See supra nn. 112-116 and accompanying text.
399. Amy, supran. 13, at 163.
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groups. Critics of multiparty systems fear that under a multiparty system the
powerful centrifugal forces will form "their own political parties ... , intensifying rather
than moderating the conflicts between them.
'4°1
In fact, Professor Amy documents that in the real world multiparty systems operate
very effectively to diffuse group conflict. They do so because in multiparty systems
negotiations among the diverse groups take place after elections during the organization
of the legislative bodies.402 Given that elections in multiparty systems produce more
diverse legislatures, negotiations are conducted among representatives of most elements
of society so that the compromises achieved are more likely to be accepted by the
electorate than the solutions to major problems produced by the legislatures in two-party
systems.
40 3
This great potential for multiparty systems to produce legislative solutions to
pressing problems that will be widely accepted by the electorate in great measure is a
function of such systems producing legislative majorities that truly represent the majority
will of the people. 404 Voter turnout tends to be greater in multiparty systems than in
two-party systems, since voters have a much better chance of finding candidates who
best represent their views and also have a realistic chance of electing some of these
candidates. 40 5  As a consequence, in their totality, the views of the representatives
elected to legislative bodies in multiparty systems are more likely to reflect accurately
the range and strength of opinion within the electorate.
40 6
Finally, Professor Amy convincingly demonstrates that multiparty systems may be
superior in producing governing stability. To this end, he characterizes governing
stability as the avoidance of wild shifts in governing philosophies in the wake of modest
electoral margins for election winners. Professor Amy notes that multiparty systems
provide stability because elections usually produce only incremental changes in
legislative governing coalitions.40 7  Therefore, legislation produced by succeeding
legislative bodies in multiparty systems tends to reflect only incremental policy and
practice changes. 408  In contrast, Professor Amy cites the 1994 U.S. Congressional





404. Amy, supra n. 13, at 166.
405. Id. at 164-65. Turnout in multiparty systems approach 80-90%, whereas turnout in two-party systems
is often 50% or less. Id. at 164.
406. Id. at 165. In part this is due to the fact that minorities have realistic opportunities to elect persons who
are truly representative of their concerns. Id. It is also function of the multidistrict/proportionate
representation feature that does not allow the party who wins the most votes to receive all of the representatives
from a given geographic area. Amy, supra n. 13, at 165. For example, under the two-party/single member
district system, in a state with seven congressional districts, a political party will elect all seven congressmen if
its nominees win the plurality in every district. See id. at 166. If that same state elected congressmen at large
under a proportionate representation system, even if the nominees of a single party won an average of 60% of
the vote, at least two if not three congressmen would come from parties other than the winning party. Id.
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governing philosophy, for with 51.3% of the vote the Republican Party took over
Congress and began pushing to enact its Contract with America.
40 9
This demythologizing of the two-party mystique is not offered to convince anyone
that the United States, or any state therein, should anytime soon take action to bring
about a viable multiparty system. Rather, it is offered to demonstrate that the U.S.
Supreme Court has used a false premise as justification for imposing severe and
unnecessary restraints on the political association rights of parties and voters under the
pretext of promoting political stability, preventing party splintering, and preventing
excessive factualism.
Perhaps the Jones Court would have struck down blanket primaries even if the
two-party mystique had not been developed in Timmons, for blanket primaries force
unwilling political parties to accept large risks that primaries will produce nominees and
messages that reject their traditional principles. Such risks are absent when a party
voluntarily agrees to let persons other than its registered members participate in its
primary elections. The party voluntarily chooses a path that may alter its ideology and
the character of its nominees. Its choice gives primary election voters more
opportunities to determine who ultimately will represent them. If the experiment is
successful, the party will win more elections, thereby forcing its competitors to consider
changing their ideologies and the scope of their political associations. Unfortunately,
Clingman stands as a perhaps insurmountable obstacle to experiments in broadening
primary election associations. Any stability it produces will likely be a paralyzing stasis
arising from a policy that equates vigorous political competition with political
destabilization.
409. Amy, supran. 13, at 165.
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